国际法律观察 ▎第 30期
发表时间:2024-11-07 00:00
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副 主 编:封海滨、刘 怡、车艳梅
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梁新越
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新加坡支付服务提供商牌照申请新规
吴庚
作者:吴庚
个人简介:吴庚律师是百年律所德尊(新加坡)律师事务所(Drew & Napier LLC)公司金融部的董事。作为新加坡执业律师,吴律师的执业领域包括融资并购、资本市场、合规以及企业法律顾问工作。他毕业于北京大学获得法学学士学位,并在新加坡和美国取得了研究生学位。在进入私人执业领域之前,他在中国的法院从事了几年的法律工作。他在新加坡的法律职业生涯已经超过20年,对新加坡的法律实践和程序有着广泛的经验和深刻的理解。
电话: +65 6531 2310
电邮: geng.wu@drewnapier.com
微信:wugenglawyer
地址:Drew & Napier LLC, 10 Collyer Quay, #10-01 Ocean Financial Centre, Singapore 049315
摘要:
新加坡金融管理局于2024年7月26日更新了《支付服务提供商牌照指南》(PS-G01),更新从2024年8月26日起正式生效。此次更新主要涉及以下几个方面:适当人选标准的严格要求、关键人员的能力要求、基础资本的补充要求、合规性安排的调整以及申请文件的新增要求。特别地,对于涉及数字支付代币服务的申请人,新加坡金融管理局进一步加强了合规要求。本文将介绍本次更新的主要内容及其对支付牌照申请人的建议。
正文:
2024年7月26日,新加坡金融管理局(Monetary Authority of Singapore)(“新加坡金管局”)发布了修改后的《支付服务提供商牌照指南》(PS-G01)(“《指南》”),《指南》列出了新加坡2019年《支付服务法》(Payment Services Act 2019)(“《支付服务法》”)下支付服务提供商牌照的资格标准和申请流程。为进一步明晰规定,推进申请审批流程,并提高发放牌照流程的效率,新加坡金管局自2024年8月26日起:
要求(i)所有申请标准支付机构(“SPI”)或主要支付机构(“MPI”)牌照的新申请人,以及(ii)申请更改其牌照以增加数字支付代币(“DPT”)(通常称为加密货币)服务的现有牌照持有人,提交一份法律意见书;
要求所有新牌照申请以及为提供DPT 服务更改牌照的申请提交一份独立外部审计师的评估报告;以及对被评估为没有做好充分审查准备的申请实施申请搁置流程。
具体而言,本次新加坡金管局对指南的更新和修改内容大致总结如下:
1. 适当人选(Fit and Proper)标准的强化
根据最新《指南》,申请人有责任确保其董事、首席执行官、股东和雇员等相关人员符合“适当人选标准”[FSG-G01]。该标准不仅要求相关人员具备诚实、正直和良好声誉、能力及才干,还要求其具备财务稳健性。除此之外,新加坡金管局还将考虑其他因素,如利益冲突以及相关人员对新加坡实体的时间承诺。尤其值得注意的是,申请人及其关联实体不得有任何不良声誉,特别是在金融犯罪方面。
新加坡金管局强调,申请人应主动承担起确保相关人员符合适当人选标准的责任,而不是由新加坡金管局来证明。申请人需要在提交申请材料时附上相关人员背景调查的详细资料,以便新加坡金管局进行审核。
2. 关键人员能力要求的细化
对于涉及支付服务的关键人员(Key Individuals),新加坡金管局规定他们必须在支付服务行业或金融服务行业中拥有足够的业务运营经验,并且熟悉新加坡支付服务提供商的监管框架。这些关键人员应能够向新加坡金管局展示其在相关领域的专业知识和实践经验,包括对新加坡支付服务监管环境的深刻理解。
该规定特别针对高层管理人员,如首席执行官(CEO)、首席运营官(COO)和首席合规官(CCO),这些关键人员在申请过程中需接受新加坡金管局的严格面试和背景调查。
3. 基础资本要求的补充说明
新加坡金管局在原有基础资本要求的基础上进一步补充,申请人必须详细说明如何持续满足该等要求。一般而言,实体的基础资本至少应能支付申请人6至12个月的运营费用。申请人需建立有效的监督机制,以确保其在任何时候都能满足基础资本要求,如定期报告或设立高于最低要求的缓冲资本。
此外,新加坡金管局建议申请人制定内部控制程序,以便在经营环境发生变化时能够及时调整基础资本配置,从而保障业务的稳定性和持续性。
4. 合规性安排的调整
在合规性安排方面,新加坡金管局允许申请人从其控股公司或海外相关实体的独立合规团队获得合规支持,但前提是必须能够证明该安排已受到申请人高层管理人员的充分监督。然而,对于DPT服务牌照的申请人,新加坡金管局提出了更严格的要求,申请人需在新加坡配备一名内部本地合规官。此举旨在提高数字支付代币服务的合规性管理水平,减少业务复杂性带来的潜在风险。
申请人需建立健全的治理结构,以便有效监督反洗钱(AML)和打击资助恐怖主义(CFT)的合规工作。新加坡金管局建议合规官定期向董事会报告相关合规事宜,以确保管理层对业务活动中的合规风险和ML/FT(反洗钱与反恐融资)风险有充分了解,并采取有效措施加以管理。
5. 申请文件的新增要求
新加坡金管局此次更新要求所有申请SPI或MPI牌照的新申请人,需在提交申请时一并提交法律意见书和外聘审计师的独立评估报告。
就法律意见书而言,该法律意见书应由具有《支付服务法》咨询经验的律师事务所出具,内容包括申请人业务模式的简要概述,以及对申请人拟议服务和/或产品是否属于《支付服务法》规定的受监管支付服务的评估。如果新加坡金管局认为初始法律意见书不明确,可要求提供第二份法律意见书。
就外聘审计师的独立评估而言,新申请人及现有的支付服务牌照持有者(除已根据《2021 年支付服务(修订)法案》(保留和过渡条款)和《2024 年条例》通知新加坡金管局的实体以外)如有意提供DPT服务,需任命一名合格的独立外聘审计师,对其反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义(AML/CFT)和消费者保护领域的政策、程序和控制措施进行独立评估。该等独立评估的报告需要与申请者的申请表格(即Form 1)一并提交,并且:
该等独立评估报告需由外聘审计员在申请提交之日起三个月内签发;
为进行独立评估,外聘审计员审查的政策和程序以及其他文件必须与申请者根据申请表格Form 1 第 8 部分提交的版本相同。对此,新加坡金管局指出,在聘请外聘审计员之前,申请人应准备好相关信息,包括但不限于其业务计划(Business Plan)、反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义以及消费者保护的政策和程序;
在进行独立评估的时候,外聘审计师需要保持其与申请人的独立性,确保其不受任何利益冲突的影响;
新加坡金管局有权力要求外聘审计员提供相关的会议记录和/或评估证明文件,作为新加坡金管局审查申请者牌照申请的一部分。
此外,申请人在获得新加坡金管局的原则性批准(In-Principle Approval)后,必须任命一名合格的独立外聘审计师,对其技术和网络安全风险领域的政策、程序和控制进行独立评估。
6. 持续合规要求
针对已获批的支付服务牌照持有者,新加坡金管局对技术风险管理提出了更高要求,特别是涉及DPT服务牌照持有者的技术风险管理需符合新加坡金管局所提供的《技术风险管理通知》(Notice on Technology Risk Management, FSM-N13),该要求将从2024年11月6日起生效。
新加坡金管局同时还更新了牌照申请流程,并提供了《审查程序的参与规则》(Rules of Engagement for the Application Review Process)。在此规则下,申请人需按要求在规定时间内全面、准确地提交所有重要信息,及时回复新加坡金管局的询问。如果申请人在申请过程中发生重大变更,新加坡金管局保留将相关申请搁置六个月的权利。具体而言:
如果新加坡金管局提出任何进一步询问,通常会为申请人提供一个答复的最后期限。如果申请人未能在规定时间内作出答复,申请人将被视为撤回申请。如果申请人需要更多时间准备答复,应提前通知案件负责人;
需要注意的是,申请人必须及时主动地向办案人员全面披露所有重要信息,不得有任何隐瞒。如果MAS发现申请人在没有充分理由的情况下故意混淆、隐瞒或拖延向新加坡金管局披露信息,这些情况将被视为重大缺陷。申请人必须采取合理的谨慎措施,确保向新加坡金管局提供的信息和文件不存在虚假或误导。违反《支付服务法》第 94(1)或 94(2)条的个人将构成犯罪,一经定罪,可处以罚款或监禁;
如果申请人在审查过程中的任何时候发生重大公司重组、主要管理人员发生重大变化(主要针对公司的主要管理职位,如首席执行官、首席财务官、首席风险官和首席合规官)或商业模式/活动发生重大变化,新加坡金管局保留将任何被评估为未充分做好审查准备的申请搁置六个月的权利。虽然这些重大变化可能是申请人无法预见的,但新加坡金管局可以在暂停期间将人力资源从这些未完成的申请中转移出来,以确保公平对待申请队列中其他准备就绪的申请人。
7. 部分支付服务定义的更新
除了前述更新,新加坡金管局也同步的更新了支付服务牌照项下部分支付服务的定义,其中:
就跨境汇款服务(cross-border money transfer services),新加坡金管局补充,该等服务除了在新加坡提供汇入或汇出汇款服务,也包括为不同国家实体之间的汇款提供便利,即使这些实体不在新加坡接受或收取汇款;
就数字支付代币服务(digital payment token services),新加坡金管局补充,除了原有的“购买或出售DPT,或提供平台允许人们交换 DPT”,也包括了传输或安排传输 DPT,为 DPT 提供托管钱包服务,在不持有货币或 DPT 的情况下积极促进 DPT 的买卖等活动。
建议:
考虑到《指南》的更新内容,为了确保支付服务牌照申请顺利获批,申请人可以参考以下几点建议:
1. 确保申请材料的全面性和准确性
在提交法律意见书时,建议选择有丰富的涉及支付服务的合规经验的律师事务所,并与其紧密合作,确保法律意见书涵盖申请人所有拟议的业务活动和服务。法律意见书不仅要对业务模式有全面描述,还需详细分析申请人提供的服务是否受《支付服务法》监管。
在选择外聘审计师时,需确保审计师具备充足的AML/CFT和消费者保护领域的专业经验。申请人应与审计师预先沟通,确保其了解申请人的业务计划、AML/CFT的政策和程序。所有提交给审计师的政策文件应与申请材料保持一致。此外,建议申请人提前准备必要的支持文件,如会议记录、培训材料等,便于审计师进行独立评估。
2. 关键人员的准备与培训
新加坡金管局在申请过程中对关键人员(如CEO、COO、CCO等)有严格的面试要求。因此,建议关键人员在申请前进行充分的内部培训和准备,以确保他们能够熟练地回答新加坡金管局关于公司业务模式、合规框架、风险管理等方面的问题。面试重点应包括关键人员对新加坡支付服务法律监管框架的理解、对公司内部控制措施的掌握程度以及应对潜在监管风险的策略。
此外,对于申请DPT服务牌照的公司,需在新加坡配置一名内部本地合规官。建议在招聘过程中优先选择具备支付行业和AML/CFT经验的候选人,并为其提供充分的内部培训和支持,确保其能够胜任此关键岗位的职责。
3. 加强内部控制与合规管理
申请人应制定完善的基础资本管理方案。基础资本不仅是申请中的重要考量因素,还是持续合规的关键。建议申请人根据自身业务规模和未来发展规划,制定一份详尽的资本管理方案,确保在6至12个月内能够覆盖运营成本。同时,设置定期监控机制,及时调整资本储备,避免因市场变化导致资本不足。
此外,申请人应确保技术和网络安全风险管理。DPT服务牌照持有者需遵守新加坡金管局的技术风险管理通知(FSM-N13),这意味着申请人需有完备的IT系统和网络安全管理制度。建议申请人在技术风险管理领域进行内部审计,提前发现潜在风险,并制定整改措施。同时,可以考虑引入专业的网络安全顾问团队,对IT系统的安全性进行全面评估和提升。
4. 制定全面的治理与合规架构
申请人应建立完善的治理架构,明确合规官、董事会、管理层等各方的角色与责任。合规官应定期向董事会报告合规工作及AML/CFT风险管理情况,并就重大合规问题提出建议和改进措施。董事会应定期审议合规报告,并提供必要的支持和资源。
此外,在组织内部建立强有力的合规文化至关重要。建议申请人定期为员工开展合规培训,确保他们理解并遵守相关法规和公司政策。同时,申请人可以考虑设置报告机制,鼓励员工向管理层报告潜在合规问题,确保公司在发现问题时能够迅速采取行动。
5. 保持与新加坡金管局的积极沟通
在牌照申请过程中,申请人应及时回应新加坡金管局的所有询问,并在规定的时间内提交所需的补充文件。如果无法在截止日期前提交,建议提前告知新加坡金管局案件负责人,并申请延长期限。切勿出现隐瞒、延迟或误导性的披露,这将被视为重大缺陷,可能导致申请被撤回。
如果在申请过程中发生重大变更(如公司重组、管理层变动或业务模式调整),申请人需第一时间通知新加坡金管局,并提供详细说明和应对措施。这有助于新加坡金管局全面了解申请人的情况,并有助于维护良好的合作关系。
6. 业务模式的规划与调整
申请人应在申请前审查其业务模式与《支付服务法》及其他相关法律法规的符合性,确保所有拟提供的服务都在法律框架内。对于一些新兴的业务模式(如DeFi、NFT等),需特别关注其法律属性和监管要求,避免因法律不确定性而影响申请进度。
如申请人的业务涉及多个司法管辖区,应充分考虑跨境业务的合规性问题,并在申请材料中说明如何解决跨境监管冲突。可以考虑在新加坡之外的主要市场(如欧盟、美国)设立合规团队,以便及时应对当地监管变化。
7. 长期合规管理计划的制定
除了获得牌照的目的以外,企业还需要制定长期的合规管理计划,以应对未来可能出现的监管变化和业务挑战。建议该计划应包括定期内部审计、员工培训、合规政策更新以及与监管机构的持续沟通等内容。
结语:
新加坡金管局此次对《指南》的更新表明新加坡支付服务的监管环境日益严格,合规要求更加细化。企业在申请支付牌照时,需充分了解并遵守所有最新规定,并与合规顾问和法律团队紧密合作,确保申请材料的准确性和全面性。申请人在提交申请前期的积极准备、完善内部管理以及在申请过程中与新加坡金管局的有效沟通,将有助于提高牌照申请的成功率。
免责声明:
本文内容不构成法律意见,亦不应依赖本文内容做出任何决策。具体情况请咨询新加坡专业法律顾问。
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诸思诚
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作者:诸思诚 个人简介:诸思诚律师目前在香港毅嘉大律师事务所作为大律师执业,并且在香港大学担任兼职讲师。诸思诚律师同时具有内地的国家统一法律职业资格。 诸思诚律师在香港主要处理商业金融诉讼、财产保全和资产追回类案件、跨境婚姻家事和信托类纠纷,以及国际商业仲裁案件。诸思诚律师曾受内地知名律师事务所委托,为某国有银行拟收购的银团贷款份额涉及的香港法问题出具法律意见书,并参与多起有关于国际债券承销发行、票据转让纠纷、跨境判决执行和资产追回等事项的金融商业诉讼。 邮箱:Peter.zhu@resolution-chambers.com 电话:+852 2688 0161 |
前言
早在1999年,内地的最高人民法院便与香港律政司签订了《最高人民法院关于内地与香港特别行政区相互执行仲裁裁决的安排》(“《执行安排》”)。该《执行安排》于2000年生效,并且在2020年经过内地最高人民法院与香港特区政府的磋商,以补充安排的形式获得了一次更新、以反映在实务当中所出现的问题。更重要的是,在2019年,《关于内地与香港特别行政区法院就仲裁程序相互协助保全的安排》正式生效(“《保全安排》”);《保全安排》的生效,使得香港成为首个(批)可以获得内地司法系统颁发财产保全令用以支持其在地仲裁的地区。而随着《执行安排》(包括其《补充安排》)和《保全安排》的实施,在实务当中,我们也会遇到一些“怎样做”的问题,并且基于这些问题的思考和/或解决而总结出了一些小窍门、小经验。笔者在此谨以本篇文章来为各位实务界的读者作一些分享,稍逞抛砖引玉之功。
本文的大体分为两部分:在第一部分当中,笔者将对内地和香港之间用以支持仲裁程序的跨境保全的若干规则和实务经验进行一定的梳理;在本部分当中,笔者将对实务当中读者(以及诸位读者的客户)可能最感兴趣的“保全突袭”的问题进行一定的探讨和阐述。重要的是,在笔者看来,紧急仲裁程序可能会是未来的一块非常重要的业务领域,值得我们两地律师同行的研究和精进。在第二部分,笔者将对内地和香港之间仲裁裁决的执行的规则进行简要回顾,同时也会对大家感兴趣的实务经验进行一定的介绍。
内地与香港之间用以支持彼此仲裁程序的跨境保全
保全,在内地的民事诉讼规则和司法实践实务当中又通常会分为财产保全和行为保全。而在香港,保全一般是指财产冻结令(Mareva Injunction/ freezing order)和所有权强制令(Proprietary Injunction)。在仲裁的语境当中,保全一般会被归纳在临时措施或者临时救济(Interim Measures/ Interim Relief)项下。在本文当中,笔者主要探讨的是财产保全(或者冻结)。
香港仲裁,内地保全
如果一个仲裁在香港展开,以香港为仲裁地,选择在符合《保全安排》第二条第一款项下合资格的仲裁机构、进行机构仲裁,那么根据《保全安排》,在仲裁裁决作出之前,当事人可以在内地申请有关财产保全,用以支持正在香港进行的机构仲裁。
对于中国内地的实务工作者来说,如欲从事内地-香港之间的跨境保全业务,了解并且熟悉《保全安排》是至关重要的。尤其是《保全安排》第四条,其是关于向内地人民法院申请保全所要求提交的文件(包括:(1)保全申请书、(2)保全协议、(3)身份证明文件、(4)机构仲裁证明文件(例如《受理函》或者《转介函》)以及(5)人民法院所需要的其他材料(主要包括翻译件、公证文书以及保全所需的保函等)。《保全安排》的第五条则为我们列明了保全申请书的内容要求。
对于在香港进行仲裁,而由内地人民法院提供财产保全的这一类业务,香港国际仲裁中心(HKIAC,“港仲”)会定期发布和更新非常具有权威性和高度参考性的《常见问题》。该《常见问题》对我们实务工作者来说,无异于是天赐般的宝贵资源,值得我们定期学习和参考。例如,根据《常见问题》(问题8),我们可以知晓,港仲通常会采取一个极其高效率的方式来处理保全申请,他们会在收齐材料之后24小时之内出具《受理函》。再例如,根据《常见问题》(问题9),截止2022年6月23日的数据,根据内地法院发出的 52 项裁定中的 37 项,内地法院发出裁定平均所需时间为自收到保全申请起 17.7 天。时间中位数为 8 天。
就大家可能更关心的那些,没有反映在《常见问题》当中的一些实务要点,就笔者这两年所经办的案件的经验而言,笔者认为,还应当注意以下三点:第一,有相当一部分地区的人民法院(例如北京四中院),仅接受由港仲(或其他合资格的仲裁机构)转递申请材料,而不接受当事人的直接申请;所以,与拟提出申请地区的有关人民法院事先进行司法沟通,对于节省时间、开展工作,极其重要。第二,在提交完材料之后,有时人民法院不会直接以书面审理的方式发布《民事裁定书》,而是会要求进行一轮访谈/咨询;因此作为当事人的内地代表律师,应当要了解案情、熟悉材料,同时随时准备出庭,以能够尽可能地协助人民法院早日下达保全命令。第三,在获得内地人民法院颁发的《民事裁定书》(财产保全)案件当中,笔者(以及与笔者合作的内地律师团队)会不时遇到保单方面的问题,这既可能是人民法院由于案件较为新颖的缘故,对于形式要件的审查会做到比较详细(例如保单),也可能是因为投保机构为了降低自身的出险风险,而要求当事人的律师团队对其提出的问题进行较为详细的解答。因此,(1)在时间上,保单的处理有可能会需要一定的时间,甚至可能经常超过港仲所预估的17.7天的中位时间,对此我们需要管理好客户的预期;同时(2)由于内地财产保全申请通常需要保单(金融机构除外),保险机构对于这类跨境保全会审查较细、问题较多,当事人的内地和香港律师团队对此需要加强配合,以最大地为当事人节省时间。
内地仲裁,香港保全
如果是在中国内地进行的仲裁,那么当事人依据香港的《仲裁条例》和《高等法院条例》香港判例,其向香港特区的高等法院申请财产保全。
在香港,有关用以支持内地仲裁程序的财产保全(临时措施),主要的赋能条款是香港《仲裁条例》(香港法例第609章)的第45条和有关普通法判例。然而,《仲裁条例》当中的第45条第4款非常值得注意,那就是:
(4) 原讼法庭可基于以下理由,拒绝根据第(2)款批给临时措施 ——
(a) 所寻求的临时措施,在当时是仲裁程序的标的;及
(b) 原讼法庭认为,由仲裁庭处理所寻求的临时措施,更为适当。
换言之,如果一个仲裁庭已经成立,那么会存在这样一种可能,即由于仲裁庭的组建代表着当事人双方自治权的行使,而基于“仲裁友好”的政策考量,香港法庭会认为有关颁出临时措施(财产保全)的权力,可能由仲裁庭行使更为恰当和合适,因而拒绝批给临时措施。这一观点,在香港高等法院的判例A v. B (Arbitration: Interim Relief Application) 一案当中,便有体现。
如果一个案件需要交给仲裁庭来处理有关财产保全问题,我们必须要了解到,那就是仲裁当中所有程序都将会以“通知”和“告知”为原则;这是因为,如果一方没有在仲裁程序当中将有关动议通知另一方,该方将不可避免地承受未来仲裁裁决受到挑战乃至推翻的风险。但是,如果我们的财产保全申请需要提前告知另一方,那么等于我们的当事人就要冒着对方很有可能转移财产的风险了。在这种情况下,所谓的“保全突袭”就是有必要的了。
“保全突袭”的三条途径
如上所知,“保全突袭”会是我们在内地仲裁实务当中经常需要考虑的一个问题。但是,有关“保全突袭”的问题,我们需要考虑哪些“门道”?我们又有哪些方案呢?结合过往经验和有关判例,笔者认为,我们至少需要三个方面的“门道”,即(1)适用法,(2)预算管理,以及(3)对手情势的分析。而我们可能拥有的三条途径则包括:(1)向仲裁庭申请保全,(2)向香港法院申请保全,以及(3)在仲裁庭组成之前,启动紧急仲裁程序。
就适用法而言,这是一个实务当中所必须要考虑到的首要问题。这个问题产生的原因,是因为在内地的民事诉讼和仲裁当中,关于权力机关何时可以发出财产保全的标准和香港方面的标准,是存在着很大的不同的。就内地而言,财产保全的有关依据是《民事诉讼法》的第一百零四条的第一款:
第一百零四条 人民法院对于可能因当事人一方的行为或者其他原因,使判决难以执行或者造成当事人其他损害的案件,根据对方当事人的申请,可以裁定对其财产进行保全、责令其作出一定行为或者禁止其作出一定行为;当事人没有提出申请的,人民法院在必要时也可以裁定采取保全措施。
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这一条件也经常被解释成“保全的必要性”,即债权人的实体权利请求有日后不能强制执行或者难以强制执行的危险。具体而言,不能强制执行,指的是债务人存在转移财产、增设财产负担或者有其他对财产不利益的行为;而难以强制执行指的是债务人采取逃避、隐匿财产、规避日后清偿债务的行为。值得注意的是,在中国内地的语境当中,“保全的必要性”会在一定程度上强调客观的执行不能,因而包括了债务人的破产风险(以及由此带来的未来判决、裁决履行不能的风险)。与此对比的是,在香港,支持仲裁过程当中批出的财产冻结令的裁判标准,和法院程序当中一样;因此,在香港,如果想要获得有关财产冻结令,那么申请人必须要证明对方拥有“耗散财产的实质风险”(real risk of dissipation)。该风险,其实是很难在一般的违约案件当中存在的。这是因为,耗散财产的风险,指的是,客观证据能够证明或者合理地推测到,对方(被申请人)存在着一定的行为,使得其在香港的财产可能会被耗散或者转移出境外,从而让未来的判决或者裁决无法履行。而这是无法包括一般的商业风险或者破产风险这种较为客观的情势的。
就预算管理而言,在香港单方面地申请法庭的强制令或者临时措施,会需要香港事务律师团队(通常还会需要大律师的参与)。而涉及到的有关材料包括誓词(誓章)、传票、草拟的令状和开庭提纲等等,相关的费用也会较为高昂。作为对比,如果可以向内地的仲裁庭或者紧急仲裁员申请并且获得其颁发的临时措施和命令,那么在香港仅需经过一次书面审理的执行程序,此项目的价格一般也会十分合理。
就对手情势而言,如之前所述,如果向仲裁庭申请临时措施,则我方当事人需要按照仲裁规则通知对方。此时,我方当事人将不得不承担因为通知对方而带来的“打草惊蛇”的风险。而如果径行向香港法庭提出申请,由于其允许“单方面地”(unilaterally)申请,我方可以在不通知对方的情况下,即可取得有关财产保全的命令,因而该条路径具有隐秘性和及时性的特点。
基于以上三个要素,笔者制作了下列表格,以便读者更直观地能够了解和分析笔者提到的三条“保全突袭”路径的各自利弊:
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适用法 |
预算经费 |
对手情势 |
向仲裁庭申请 |
内地法 |
较低 |
通知对方 |
向香港法庭申请 |
香港法 |
较高 |
不通知对方 |
紧急仲裁员程序 |
内地法 |
较低 |
通知对方,但通知期较短 |
基于以上表格,笔者需要重点地分析一下紧急仲裁员程序的有关利弊:首先,紧急仲裁员程序和从仲裁庭获得临时措施一样,也是需要通知对方当事人的。但是,由于紧急仲裁程序内在地具有“紧急”的熟悉,其通常会要求紧急仲裁员在一个较短的时间内(例如《贸仲规则》附件三,第六条:紧急仲裁员需在其被指定后的15日内作出决定)发出命令。在一般的商事案件当中,由于紧急仲裁员程序是在仲裁庭组成之前,对方当事人(作为一个内地的商事主体)可能此时还在处于律师团队的遴选当中。因此,紧急仲裁程序仍然是可以有“突袭”的熟悉存在的。
第二,从紧急仲裁程序可能面临的一些局限来说。笔者认为,可能存在以下两点值得关注:(1)紧急仲裁员程序在内地仍然算是一个较为新颖和前沿的领域,因而在客观上来说,有经验(或者说有胆识)地来处理在此程序当中临时措施的申请的仲裁员或者从业者,其实并不多;(2)承上一点,由于有关有经验的仲裁员的数量较少,同时紧急仲裁员作出的命令,仍然面临一个在香港以书面审理补强的过程,因此,当事人也会需要聘请一个当中有着精通内地、香港法律和司法实践的团队,以协助紧急仲裁员、香港法庭和当事人,尽快地完成命令的批出,冻结目标财产。
内地与香港之间仲裁裁决的相互执行
来到第二部分,即内地和香港之间的仲裁裁决执行这个话题。首先,从规则层面上来说,内地仲裁裁决在香港的执行,主要的赋能条款为香港《仲裁条例》(香港法例第609章)的第84条和第92条。
在实务当中,香港法庭通常会要求当事人的香港律师团队代表当事人提交:(1)一份有关申请执行的经公证的誓词,作为当中的附件同时提交(a)仲裁裁决(包括临时措施命令)的副本,和(b)仲裁协议的副本;(2)有关执行的原讼传票;以及(3)拟获得命令的草稿。值得注意的是,首先,仲裁裁决的执行,在香港的法律语境当中,是包括内地的仲裁庭和/或临时仲裁员发出的临时措施的执行的。第二,仲裁裁决的执行原则上适用的是书面审理(paper disposal),因而在文件齐备的情况下,通常仅需要3-5天的时间,我们的当事人即可拿到执行的命令。
而来到香港仲裁裁决在内地执行的这个子话题上,首先,《民事诉讼法》、《仲裁法》及其司法解释,尤其是《关于人民法院办理仲裁裁决执行案件若干问题的规定》和《最高人民法院关于仲裁司法审查案件报核问题的有关规定》(“《报核规定》”),为香港仲裁裁决在内地执行提供了较为清晰和明确的指引。特别是,《报核规定》当中第二条,有着清晰的,对于拟不予认可和执行涉港裁决须层报至最高人民法院的规定,
各中级人民法院或者专门人民法院办理涉外涉港澳台仲裁司法审查案件,经审查拟认定仲裁协议无效,不予执行或者撤销我国内地仲裁机构的仲裁裁决,不予认可和执行香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区、台湾地区仲裁裁决,不予承认和执行外国仲裁裁决,应当向本辖区所属高级人民法院报核;高级人民法院经审查拟同意的,应当向最高人民法院报核。待最高人民法院审核后,方可依最高人民法院的审核意见作出裁定。
因此,在实践当中,人民法院(不论地区)通常都会采取一个紧跟最高人民法院审判指导、批复或者意见的专业态度来处理涉港仲裁的执行案件,从而在一个香港裁决是否可执行的问题上,案件办理的可预见性通常都会较强。当然,即便可预见的规则和“仲裁友善”态度的存在,在实务当中,我们作为从业者也需要注意到诸如立案时间、审限和与此相关的诸如立案地选择等问题,以求能够在实务当中,高效地完成当事人对我们的委托。
结论
由上文当中的介绍和分析可知,在实务当中,涉港仲裁的保全和执行其实是一个规则较为清晰的领域,值得我们花时间和精力去探索、去研究。而在经办实务的过程当中,从立案到时限,从“突袭施压”到“合理延宕”,我们又有太多远非法律法规的条条框框的事项去思考、去运用、去应对。笔者期待能以此文为各位读者、同业先进带来一定的分享,也期待在未来的实践当中,能和各位一起探讨和合作。
(全文结束)
The Sanctions Regime of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America: A Comparative Analysis
Aleksandr Iarkin
作者简介: Aleksandr Iarkin, International Legal Counsel at REIZ law firm and LLM Candidate at Peking University School of Transnational Law.
Email: Iarkin.alexandr@yandex.ru Phone: +86 15899786185
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Abstract:
This article presents a comparative analysis of the sanctions regimes of the People's Republic of China and the United States. Sanctions are a critical tool in the economic and political arsenal of both nations, each employing them to pursue distinct strategic goals. The United States has developed a robust sanctions regime supported by an extensive legal framework, including primary and secondary sanctions that influence global trade dynamics. China's sanctions, while less extensive, function primarily as countermeasures to external threats to its sovereignty and national security. Through a detailed examination of each nation's sanctions laws, such as the U.S.'s Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and China's Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of 2021, the article explores the implementation mechanisms, effectiveness, and transparency of both sanctions systems. It also identifies potential improvements to China's sanctions regime, proposing steps like enhancing transparency, expanding unilateral sanctions, and reducing dependency on the U.S. dollar to strengthen its influence in global economic affairs.
Keywords: Sanctions regime, People's Republic of China, United States, economic policy, primary sanctions, secondary sanctions, Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, Trading with the Enemy Act, national security, economic influence, transparency, counter-sanctions.
Introduction
Currently, sanctions are one of the most powerful tools of economic policy, allowing global leaders to dictate their own market conditions. In the context of the escalated economic war between the United States and China, sanctions are extremely important. To illustrate this, we can refer to the fact that Chinese banks are currently refusing to have transactions with Russian organizations due to the threat of secondary US sanctions. However, why exactly does the United States have one of the most powerful sanctions regimes? Can China respond with powerful counter-sanctions and how to achieve this? In this article, the author will reveal the legislative aspects of sanctions law in the United States and China, main government bodies who is in charge of implementing and managing sanctions. Finally, the author will propose possible solutions to improve China's sanctions policy.
Part 1. The United States sanctions regime
Sanctions are restrictive measures of an economic and political nature applied by a country or group of countries to another country or group of countries in order to force the Governments of the target States to change their policies.
For many years, the United States has successfully used the imposition of primary and secondary sanctions as an economic and political instrument. There are several statistical facts about the scope and effectiveness of US sanctions.
In 2021, the US government implemented 765 new sanctions designations targeting specific countries such as Belarus, Myanmar, China, and Russia. Furthermore, the reinforcement of secondary sanctions on Iran significantly affected Iran’s major economic sectors, including energy.
Also, sometimes US sanctions can be exerted by multilateral effort. For instance, US actions against Russia were bolstered through collaborations with the G7 and other partners, targeting critical areas such as military-industrial sectors and energy revenues. Moreover, US strategically imposed sector-specific sanctions, which have been particularly effective against sectors like finance in Venezuela and Russia. These sanctions limited access to crucial US markets and services, posing significant challenges to the targeted sectors and thereby increasing pressure.
These examples demonstrate that the United States sanctions are effective and serve as a powerful foreign policy tool capable of imposing substantial economic and political pressure.
One of the reasons why US sanctions are so effective is a detailed system of legal acts regulating the US sanctions regime. The author will describe below the most significant legal acts regarding the US sanctions.
1) Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 allows the government to restrict trade and financial transactions with countries that are considered hostile towards the United States. This can include sanctions against countries that pose a threat to national security or violate international norms.
2) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is a United States law enacted to govern foreign aid and development programs. It established the United States Agency for International Development and created a framework for providing economic and military assistance to foreign countries, with the aim of promoting economic growth, democratic governance, and humanitarian aid. If governments restrict or violate human rights, the United States restricts or cancels international aid programs.
3) National Emergencies Act of 1976
The National Emergencies Act of 1976 is a United States federal law that regulates how the President can declare national emergencies. It was enacted in response to concerns over the unchecked power of the executive branch to declare emergencies without clear guidelines or oversight. This law introduces the need for the President to notify the US Congress of the introduction of new states of emergency.
4) Export Control Reform Act in 2018
Since 2018, the United States has also had an updated version of the basic Export Control Law, created through the adoption of the Export Control Reform Act in 2018. It explicitly authorizes the President to control the export, re-export and transfer of all kinds of goods, software and technologies within the country, and, among other things, clarifies the powers of control in accordance with IEEPA. In general, sanctions are imposed on the statutory basis. The purpose of the Export Control Reform Act is to enhance US national security by improving the government's ability to control the export of modern technologies and materials that may potentially be used for illegal purposes, such as, for example, terrorism or the creating of weapons of mass destruction. This Act also seeks to simplify the export control process, making it easier for businesses to comply with the legislation while still safeguarding vital national security interests.
5) International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA)
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 is a United States federal law that gives the President the authority to regulate commerce during a state of national security emergency. The Act was enacted in response to the increasing use of economic sanctions by the United States government as a tool of foreign policy.
Under the IEEPA, the President has broad powers to impose economic sanctions on foreign nations or entities that pose a threat to national security or foreign policy interests of the US. These sanctions can include freezes on assets, trade restrictions, and prohibitions on financial transactions. The President can also block transactions involving property.
The IEEPA requires the President to declare a national emergency in order to exercise these powers, but the definition of what constitutes a national security is broad and can be interpreted queite freely. The Act also allows the President to delegate these powers to other government agencies, such as the Department of the Treasury or the Department of Commerce.
This legal act is very important because, in essence, it gives broad powers to apply the national security exception, that is extremely significant because currently, the concept of national security is used not only to protect the economic system of the state, but also to strengthen competitiveness and weaken competitors. This development is manifested in a remarkable speech by U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan which outlined the endgame strategy. «No longer is “relative advantage” (i.e., dominance) a justification for national security grounded measures, but rather, competition itself is sufficient to trigger a legitimate national security threat. Accordingly, investment and trade measures to prevent a competitor from closing any gaps constitutes legitimate national defense.» Moreover, according to the views of some US academics, U.S. global dominance constitutes a core national security interest and defending security justifies investment and trade policies that are designed to not merely contain, but rather rollback and weaken China.
The next reason for the success of the US sanctions regime is a clear, regulated and transparent system for the implementing, managing and controlling of sanctions. The US sanctions regime allows for notice and comment through Federal Register publications. Affected entities can challenge also their designation by sending a "Delisting Petition" to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) or through lawsuits in federal court. Delisting petitions require evidence that the initial reasons for designation no longer apply. Affected parties may also engage with authorities and provide additional information to support their delisting efforts.
The first step in implementing US sanctions is identifying the target country, individual, entity, or economical sector that is engaged in illegal activities that violate international norms or threaten US national security interests. After this, the President of the United States or relevant government agencies determine that sanctions are necessary and have the legal authority to impose them. This authority may come from existing laws and regulations (generally, International Emergency Economic Powers Act) or specific legislation targeting a particular country or entity. Then the President typically issues an executive order formally declaring the imposition of sanctions. When the executive order is issued, relevant government bodies such as the Department of the Treasury, Department of State, and Department of Commerce work together to implement the sanctions. This may involve freezing assets, restricting trade, blocking transactions, prohibiting investment, or other measures depending on the specific sanctions. US government authorities, such as the Office of Foreign Assets Control in Treasury Department, enforce the sanctions by monitoring, investigating violations, and imposing restrictive measures on individuals or entities that violate the sanctions. Besides, US sanctions are from time to time reviewed to evaluate their impact and effectiveness. They may be expanded, modified or finished based on changing circumstances.
Except the detailed system of legal acts and cooperation work of government bodies in the area of sanctions, the US has significant global influence because of the power of US dollar, which allows it to effectively enforce sanctions by pressuring other countries and businesses to comply. This can further isolate the targeted country and limit its ability to evade the sanctions. Basically, there are two types of sanctions that the US imposes. Primary sanctions are direct restrictions imposed on a country, entity, or individual, prohibiting the US people and companies from engaging in specific activities with them. Secondary sanctions extend these restrictions to non-US entities, pressuring foreign companies and governments to comply with the US sanctions or get penalties such as, for example, losing access to the US market. The secondary sanctions have been criticized by the US academics for their extraterritorial reach and potential to tense international relations by compelling foreign entities to adhere to the US policies. Additionally, the US has advanced technological capabilities that allow it to monitor and enforce sanctions more effectively, such as tracking financial transactions or enforcing export controls on modern technologies.
In conclusion, US sanctions serve as a crucial foreign policy tool that allows the United States to exert significant economic and political pressure on targeted countries. The scope and effectiveness of US sanctions have been demonstrated through numerous examples, including the imposition of sector-specific sanctions and collaborative efforts with international partners from G7 to enhance effectiveness. The detailed legal framework regulating the US sanctions regime, national security concept and the clear process for introducing, implementing, and adjusting sanctions have contributed to their success along with the technological capabilities and power of the US dollar.
Part 2. The sanctions regime of the People's Republic of China
China's approach to sanctions and its legislative framework for implementing them is significantly different from that of Western countries such as the United States. If the US prefer using sanctions as unilateral measures and a method of economic pressure, Chinese sanctions are generally countermeasure, meaning they are often created in response to actions of foreign governments or entities that are seen as harmful to China’s sovereignty and security interests.
Below is an overview of the main legislation and the legal framework regarding sanctions in China.
1. Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (2021)
This law allows China to take countermeasures against foreign entities and individuals involved in actions that China perceives as harmful on its sovereignty and security. The law provides a legal basis for imposing sanctions and was used to punish the US and EU officials on issues like Hong Kong and Xinjiang. The law also indicates that listed entities cannot challenge their status, and removal can only happen by the decision of the government authorities. In contrast, the US law allows sanctioned entities to seek judicial review, present evidence to contest their designation, and petition the Office of Foreign Assets Control for reconsideration, ensuring procedural fairness and rights to take legal measures. This indicates the difference in approaches between China and the US regarding due process and legal framework for sanctioned entities. In the US, the legal framework ensures that sanctioned entities can contest their designation and seek actions through administrative and judicial channels.
2. Export Control Law (2020)
China's Export Control Law, revised in 2020, helps to regulate the export of important goods and technologies that can affect national security. This law includes restrictions on dual-use items and technologies that are used for both civilian and military goals. The law is intended to prevent spreading of weapons of mass destruction. China's Export Control Law imposes strict sanctions for violations, including fines up to 20 times the value of the illegal export transaction, confiscation of illegal gains, revocation or suspension of export licenses, and export bans. Severe violations can result in criminal penalties, including imprisonment. Additionally, names of the companies or individuals who are violators can be publicly disclosed, entities can be blacklisted, restricting future exports, and responsible individuals can get fines and bans.
3. Blocking Statute (2021)
The Blocking Status establishes that Chinese entities report any restrictive measures imposed by foreign governments, allowing the Ministry of Commerce to issue orders to block the enforcement of such measures within China. This law is created to protect Chinese businesses from international sanctions and enhance China's sovereignty in its domestic affairs.
4. New Unreliable Entity List (2023)
First applied in February 2023, the new UEL targets foreign companies and individuals that are perceived to threaten China's national security or threaten on the rights of Chinese business companies. Entities on this list face various restrictions, including bans on trade and investment activities in China. This measure serves as a response to the same US actions and is part of China strategy to protect its economic interests. To be removed from UEL, a company must follow a particular process. It starts with demonstrating corrective actions and ensuring full compliance with Chinese laws. Next, the company submits a formal petition to Chinese authorities, detailing its actions and future compliance proves. Authorities provide a review, including possible investigations to comply with China's national security and economic interests. Once reviewed, the authorities decide on removal and notify the company, ensuring only genuinely compliant entities are delisted. The government also may decide to remove a foreign entity from the Unreliable Entity List on its own initiative and should do so if the foreign entity deletes the consequences of its actions within the specified period.
These laws collectively form the China’s legal framework for implementing and managing sanctions. They provide the Chinese government with the instruments needed to implement and enforce sanctions based on national security concerns, foreign policy goals and economic interests. Unlike the aggressive unilateral sanction’s regime of the US, China's sanctions framework is generally defensive, acted to counteract measures perceived as hostile or harmful to its national interests. Foreign companies listed under China's sanctions framework, including the UEL, have several rights. They can defend themselves with evidence and arguments. Also, they can receive information on the reasons and evidence for their inclusion and expect a fair treatment during investigations.
In China, several key governmental bodies are involved in the implementation and managing of the sanction’s regime.
Ministry of Commerce. This body is primarily responsible for formulating trade policies and regulations, including those related to sanctions and export controls. MOFCOM plays a critical role to oversee the administration of trade-related sanctions.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This ministry handles the diplomatic aspects of sanctions, coordinating international positions and managing the geopolitical implications of sanctioning foreign entities and nations.
State Council. Acts like the chief administrative authority in China, the State Council oversees the strategic implementation of sanctions and ensures that they align with national policy goals.
People’s Bank of China. The central bank plays a role in financial sanctions, overseeing financial transactions and working to prevent financial flows that can violate sanction regulations.
These government bodies work together to ensure the enforcement of sanctions is consistent with China’s international obligations and national security interests. Each body has specific roles and responsibilities, but their efforts are coordinated to maintain unified sanctions policy.
Regarding practice of recent times, China has imposed several high-profile and impactful sanctions over the years. Below are some notable examples of effective Chinese sanctions:
In response to South Korea’s decision in 2017 year to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, China imposed a series of economic measures including restrictions on tourism, cultural exchanges, and the operations of South Korean entities in China, most notably for the retail giant Lotte. These China’s economic measures were widely seen as retaliatory actions against South Korea’s government decision and as a tool of economic coercion rather than formal findings against companies. The sanctions led to significant economic losses for South Korea, particularly in the tourism sector because of significant decrease of Chinese tourists. Lotte had to shut down several stores in China because of this regulatory pressure.
In 2022 after Lithuania allowed Taiwan to open a representative office in its capital, Vilnius, which China viewed as a violation of its Chinese national interests, China downgraded diplomatic relations with Lithuania and, in fact, imposed trade embargo, blocking Lithuanian goods and products containing Lithuanian components from entering to China. The sanctions caused issues in supply chains for Lithuanian companies and international firms that were relying on Lithuanian goods. Despite this, there were no clear formal findings implicating Lithuanian companies in the decision. China's actions were perceived as retaliatory against Lithuania's government rather than a response to any involvement of Lithuanian companies. These measures were considered to be aimed to pressure Lithuania economically and diplomatically for what China saw as a violation of policy and national interests.
In 2020, following Australia’s call for an independent inquiry in origins of COVID-19, China imposed a series of tariffs and bans on Australian goods for 80.5% on barley, along with bans and restrictions on beef, wine, and coal imports. These measures significantly affected Australia’s exports, leading to substantial economic losses in the abovementioned sectors. Regarding the findings of this issue, China's Ministry of Commerce released its own statement saying: «There was a subsidy for imported barley originating in Australia, the domestic barley industry was substantially damaged, and there was a causal relationship between the subsidy and the actual damage.» Australia's Minister for Trade Simon Birmingham responded by stating: «We reject the basis of this decision and will be assessing the details of the findings while we consider next steps.»
Thus, the issue regarding the findings remained controversial with different opinions of China and Australia.
In 2023, China announced further restrictions on exports of key materials like gallium and germanium, which are critical for semiconductor production. This move is seen as a response to the US export controls on advanced semiconductor technology to China. Additionally, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs imposed sanctions on entities involved in arms sales to Taiwan and interactions with Taiwanese politicians, marking a more aggressive move in its foreign policy.
Recently, in May 2024, China has decided to impose sanctions against 12 US military-industrial companies and 10 of their top managers for selling weapons to Taiwan and as a response to sanctions against Chinese enterprises for cooperation with Russia. Regarding the challenging of these Chinese sanctions, while direct legal challenges within China may be limited due to the finality of these decisions, using international legal frameworks, diplomatic pressure, and seeking support from international organizations like the WTO can provide alternative leverages for challenging Chinese sanctions. The effectiveness of Chinese sanctions has varied, reflecting the country's strategic approach and the specific targets of these restrictive measures. Generally, China's sanctions are less about causing economic pressure to influence global affairs and more like countermeasures against foreign actions that China perceives as undermining its sovereign and national interests. There is often a direct linkage between foreign sanctions and Chinese responsive countersanctions. For instance, China has imposed sanctions on the US individuals and entities in response to US sanctions related to human rights abuses in Xinjiang and the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong. Similarly, as written above, China sanctioned Lithuanian officials after Lithuania allowed Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius. Another example is abovementioned recent sanctions against the US companies in response to US sanctions on Chinese companies. Despite the abovementioned examples, globally, the overall impact of Chinese sanctions on changing international policies or behaviors seems limited. Sanctions imposed by China have not led to significant shifts in policies by major powers like the United States. They appear more effective as tools for domestic signaling and less so for compelling crucial changes in foreign policies.
Thus, despite some successes, China's sanctions system still needs to be improved. Below, the author suggests some ways that, in his opinion, can help improve China's sanctions regime in order to build a clearer and more powerful sanctions policy, which will lead to an increase in China's influence on the world stage. Regarding the ability of the foreign companies to protect its rights in China, the entities that are facing sanctions in China have several leverages to protect their rights. Demonstrating compliance with Chinese regulations and taking corrective actions can mitigate the impact of sanctions and may lead to their removal or reduction. Companies also have the right to submit formal petitions and appeals to Chinese authorities, supported by evidence of compliance and corrective measures taken. Using diplomatic channels with their home governments can provide additional support in negotiations with Chinese authorities.
Collaboration with other countries and international bodies such as, for example, BRICS countries in the future can significantly enhance the efficacy of Chinese sanctions. By aligning its sanctions policies with those of key allies (for instance, Russia) China can amplify the pressure on sanctioned countries, entities individuals and increase global influence to the sanctions regime.
Legal enforcement of sanctions procedures, including mechanisms for implementing measures and monitoring their compliance, still remain opaque in China. Therefore, there is a strong need for increasing the transparency of how sanctions are applied, including detailed procedures for the imposition and lifting of sanctions.
Avoiding dollar dependence in transactions. Despite the successful conduct of transactions in RMB, the US dollar still remains a global currency, which strengthens the economic influence of the United States. A significantly important step towards weakening dollarization may be the creation of a platform that will replace SWIFT. Currently, Russia and China are working together to create this system.
The expansion of the application of unilateral sanctions. Despite China's ideological position against unilateral sanctions measures, the Chinese government may impose more unilateral sanctions against countries that actively put pressure on China's economy in order to defend China’s national interests. In addition, China can use the concept of national security more widely to increase the number of unilateral sanctions in order to protect China's national sovereignty.
Conclusion
The comparative analysis of the sanction’s regimes of the People's Republic of China and the United States reveals significant contrast. The US sanctions regime is solid, strengthened by comprehensive laws. The legislation system, coupled with strategic use of primary and secondary sanctions, enable the US to exert significant global economic and political pressure, enhanced by the power of the US dollar and advanced technological development.
In contrast, China's sanctions are more reactive, serving as countermeasures to confront with threats to its sovereignty and national security. While effective in specific instances, China's approach remains less transparent and effective compare to the US approach.
To enhance its sanctions regime, China can improve transparency, expand unilateral sanctions, strengthen international cooperation, and reduce dependency on the US dollar. These steps will help China develop a more powerful and coherent sanctions regime, aligning better with its strategic economic interests and enhancing its global influence.
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深圳前海合作区人民法院国际化实践与观察
曾晨婕 香港中文大学(深圳)
曾晨婕,香港中文大学(深圳)人文社科学院全日制翻译专业博士生,专攻法律翻译,获得全额奖学金。 有关本文的通讯请寄往香港中文大学(深圳)人文社科学院曾晨婕,中国深圳市龙岗区龙翔大道 2001 号,邮编 518172。 电子邮箱:chenjiezeng@link.cuhk.edu.cn |
摘要:
深圳前海合作区人民法院(以下简称“前海法院”)积极推进国际化司法服务,涉外案件数量逐年上升,尤其是来自香港特别行政区的涉外案件。前海法院通过交叉询问制度和“1+8”跨境商事法律规则衔接制度,显著提升了涉外、涉港澳台案件的审判效率,平均审理周期从2021年的7.7个月缩短到2024年的3.9个月。前海法院通过体系化的比较研究,发布《跨境商事法律规则衔接系列白皮书》《粤港澳大湾区法律规则衔接研究:公司法篇》等出版物,适用域外法审理案件,覆盖多个国家和地区。在法官人才培养方面,前海法院选任具有普通法学习背景、外语能力突出的法官,组建特色专业化合议庭,组织“法官沙龙”和“英语沙龙”活动,提高法官专业素质和外语能力。前海法院还建立了香港地区陪审员制度和港澳特邀调解员制度,截至2024年4月30日,香港陪审员参审案件978件,港澳调解员参与调解案件2534件。此外,前海法院吸引并汇集港澳专家研究员和司法研修生,开展调研活动,以夯实涉外审判改革的智力支持,继续加强法官培训、深化国际合作、完善调解机制和优化案件管理,并进一步提升其国际化水平,为跨境法律事务提供更加高效、公正的司法服务。
关键词:国际化司法服务、涉外案件、交叉询问制度、跨境商事法律规则衔接制度、审判效率、域外法适用、涉外法官人才培养、管辖权
一、 涉外案件统计
深圳前海合作区人民法院(以下简称“前海法院”)自2015年成立以来,积极推进国际化司法服务,涉外案件数量逐年上升。据前海法院官网公开的数据统计,2023年深圳市两级法院共适用国际条约及域外法审理涉外涉港澳台案件233 件,其中,前海法院适用域外法审理案件167件,包括适用香港法审理 118件。
交叉询问制度是前海法院推进跨境商事法律规则衔接制度中一项重要的改革措施。前海法院细化“1+8”跨境商事法律规则衔接制度,涵盖跨境商事诉讼的多个关键节点,通过配套制度明确简化港澳地区法人主体资格认证、推进涉港澳案件转交送达、简化域外证据审查认定等,针对性地打通影响跨境商事案件诉讼效率的痛点和堵点,提升了涉外涉港澳台案件的审判效率,平均审理周期从2021年的7.7个月缩短到截至2024年4月1日的3.9个月。
为实现不同法系间的比较研究,前海法院寻求跨境商事实体法律规则衔接的“最大公约数”,努力实现大湾区法治建设“求大同存小异”的目标,这一策略也是前海法院探索不同法系及跨境法律规则衔接的重要途径。目前,前海法院已开展公司股权转让、损害公司利益、民间借贷、保证合同、委托理财合同等13类典型纠纷的实体法律比较研究,并以《跨境商事法律规则衔接系列白皮书》《粤港澳大湾区法律规则衔接研究:公司法篇【中英文版】》的形式对外发表,为跨境投资者、法律工作者等群体提供参考。2021年,国家发展改革委将深圳“完善域外法律查明与适用体系”列为适用于全国推广的创新经验之一。2023年6月,前海法院“探索开展域外法适用范围改革”案例入选广东自贸试验区第六批制度创新案例。
总体而言,前海法院国际化的司法服务带动涉外案件数量的逐年增长,突显其在处理粤港澳大湾区法律事务中的核心地位。法院通过细化跨境商事法律规则衔接制度,涵盖多个关键节点,简化港澳地区法人主体资格认证、涉港澳案件转交送达及域外证据审查等流程,提升涉外案件审判效率。
二、 法官人才培养
前海法院认真贯彻落实最高人民法院关于加强涉外司法审判专业人才培养的部署要求,通过队伍建设、交流合作、考核激励等多维途径,加快建设涉外法治人才队伍,不断提升涉外审判工作现代化水平,并体现在以下各方面:
首先,法院选任具有普通法学习背景、外语能力突出、熟悉国际经贸规则的法官,专门审理涉外及港澳台商事案件,并组建跨境贸易、跨境金融、国际物流等六大特色专业化合议庭,提升审判专业化水平。为保障法官的专业能力,前海法院采购岗位说明书系统,制定《岗位说明书》,并完善修订《法官业绩评价办法》《法官助理业绩评价办法》,列明各岗位工作要求、考核指标、程序处理等内容,为法官与干警履职尽责提供详实学习指南。
此外,法院还邀请香港地区法律专家开展普通法系列讲座,并组织“英语沙龙”开展法律英语教学,学习研讨审判实务重难点法律问题,促进资深法官与青年法官之间经验交流,以积极培育具备国际视野、外语优势及法律知识的综合涉外审判人才。
在推动陪审制改革方面,前海法院在全国率先建立了系统规范的香港地区陪审员制度,自2016年至今,先后选任三批共81名香港地区陪审员,与法官组成合议庭,共同审理涉外、涉港澳台商事案件,有效提升了司法的区际公信力。截至2024年4月30日,香港地区陪审员共参审案件978件。
另外,法院还聘请了45名港澳地区特邀调解员参与跨境商事案件调解,实践“域外调解员+内地调解员或调解法官”联调新模式,促进内地与香港地区调解实践、模式、文化的共融共通。截至2024年4月30日,港澳地区特邀调解员参与调解案件2534件。同时,法院依托港澳专家研究员和司法研修生项目,围绕跨境商事法律规则衔接、域外法查明与适用等主题,与内地、港澳高校法学专家、硕博研究生开展联合调研活动,以夯实涉外审判改革创新的智力支持。截至2024年4月30日,共引入4名港澳专家研究员,接收6批22名司法研修生。
上述措施显著提升了前海法院涉外审判工作的专业化和国际化水平,为其处理跨境法律事务提供了强有力的人才和智力支持。
三、管辖权与涉外纠纷案件
前海法院根据相关法律规定,对特定类型的涉外案件实行集中管辖。这些案件主要包括跨境贸易纠纷、国际投资争议、知识产权纠纷等。通过集中管辖,前海法院能够更加高效地处理涉外案件,提升司法公正性和透明度。
首起案例:港澳调解机构参与跨境商事纠纷调解
该案例涉及一起跨境商事纠纷,是香港居民邵先生和香港J银行之间的贷款合同纠纷。具体情况如下:
【案件背景与管辖权】
2014年,邵先生向J银行申请了2000万港元的贷款,但未能按时归还本息。根据当事人之间的约定,双方约定在特定的管辖法院请求解决争议。2024年4月,双方决定向深圳前海合作区人民法院提起处理该纠纷。
【案件类型与调解过程】
该案件属于跨境商事纠纷,涉及贷款合同的违约问题。前海法院在案件进入诉前调解程序后,将调解工作委托给香港特邀调解组织——香港调解会进行处理。调解过程中,香港调解会的工作人员充分利用其对香港行业交易习惯的理解,迅速识别争议的焦点,并基于香港法律达成了一份调解协议。
【解决结果与效率】
完成调解后,前海法院及时为双方出具了具有执行效力的司法确认书。在整个过程中,调解采取了低成本、高效率的方式,得到了当事人的高度评价。
该案例涉及一起涉及贷款合同履行问题的跨境商事纠纷,双方约定案件由前海法院管辖。在调解过程中,香港调解会作为特邀调解组织参与,采用高效、低成本的调解机制,顺利达成调解协议并获得司法确认。这一案例成功展示了跨境商事纠纷中管辖权的合理应用,也突出了调解机制在提升解决效率和降低成本方面的重要作用。
四、总结
基于前海法院的涉外案件统计,跨境商事纠纷案件数量逐年增加,其中涉及香港的涉外跨境商事案件尤为突出。在处理此类涉外纠纷案件时,前海法院通过合理的管辖权安排,如依据当事人的约定将案件交由前海法院审理,确保了司法管辖的正当性与效率。在案件审理过程中,前海法院充分发挥了香港特邀调解组织的作用,通过高效、低成本的调解机制,成功解决纠纷,并为涉外案件的快速处理提供了有效路径。同时,前海法院高度重视涉外法治人才的培养,通过选任具有普通法背景和国际经贸规则知识的法官,并组建专业化合议庭,显著提升了涉外审判的专业化水平。这些措施不仅确保了涉外案件审理的质量与效率,还通过实践不断完善涉外纠纷解决机制,为大湾区法治建设提供了强有力的支持。
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深圳市涉外律师/涉外法治服务团人员展示
黄建堂 律师 广东瀛尊律师事务所
地 址:深圳市福田区福民路新天世纪商务中心A座27楼
电 话:+86 13632884282
电 邮: huangjiantang@winteamlawyer.com; scotthuangjt@163.com
现任职务
中国国际贸易促进委员会深圳调解中心专家调解员、深圳市前海国际商事调解中心调解员、深圳市涉外律师人才、“一带一路”律师联盟会员。
专业领域
国际贸易投融资、海商海事、外商在华投资、出口信用保险、跨境电商、知识产权、商业诉讼及仲裁争议解决。
教育及职业背景
法学与英语双学士(英语专业8级);金融学硕士。
具有法律、英语、金融、保险及国际贸易投融资的综合专业、职业背景,十三年以上法律及贸易服务经验,拥有大型央企、国企的风控法务、企业合规、风险防范及纠纷解决的法律实务经验。
英文介绍
Mr. Jiantang Huang (Scott JT Huang)
Lawyer in Guangdong Yingzun Law Firm
Contact Detail
Tel: +86 13632884282
Email: huangjiantang@winteamlawyer.com; scotthuangjt@163.com.
Address: 27/F, Building A, Xintian Century Business Center, Fumin Road, Futian District, Shenzhen City, China
Social Title
- Expert Mediator for Shenzhen Mediation Center of China Council for the Promotion of International Trade(CCPIT);
- Mediator for Shenzhen Qianhai International Commercial Mediation Center;
Field of Practice
- Corporate Counsel; Foreign Investment in China; Business Insurance and Cross-Border E-commerce;
- Legal Matters regarding International Trade, Finance and Investment, Commercial and Economic, Intellectual Property, etc.;
- Litigation or Arbitration; Dispute Resolution;
Education Background
Dual Bachelors of Law and English;Master of Finance.
何粉荣 律师 广东品法律师事务所
专业领域:
国际争议解决、仲裁
国际贸易
跨境并购及投资等
电 话:182 1952 8852
何粉荣律师 擅长业务领域: 国际争议解决、仲裁、国际贸易、境外上市并购等。
●曾任外企总经理助理、首席代表,负责公司运营、谈判等事务等;
●多年法律从业经验;获得上海仲裁委员会“国际证据法”结业证书。
●具有企业、政府法律顾问工作经历,能为政府提供有效的法律风险防范措施;熟悉企业的运营和管理模式,能够清晰地把控企业、政府的风险点,做到有针对性地进行合规审查和风险规避.
●曾代理法国公司进行诉讼,注重诉讼策略、积极沟通、协调,成功追回货款;曾代理以色列在中国设立的公司相关纠纷,注重方式、方法,兼顾效率、效益,为客户合法、合理、有据地节约相关成本;结合公司实情,为客户量身定做涉外贸易等相关合同,防范公司运营风险。
英文介绍
Attorney HE primarily specializes and has extensive experience in International dispute resolution, arbitration, international trade, overseas listing M&A, etc.
Served as the assistant of the general manager of foreign company, chief representative,responsible for the company's operation,negotiation,etc;
Many years’experience in law;Obtained the Shanghai Arbitration Commission "International Evidence Law" completion certificate.
Have the working experience of corporate, government legal adviser, can provide effective legal risk prevention measures for the government;
Familiar with the operation and management mode of the enterprise, able to clearly control the risk points of the enterprise and the government, and achieve targeted compliance review and risk avoidance.
Represented French company in litigation, figure out litigation strategy, actively communicated and coordinated, and successfully recovered payment; have acted on behalf of Israeli company in China to deal with its related disputes, and saving relevant costs for customers legally, reasonably with rational methods and efficiency,; Combined with the actual situation of the company, tailor-made foreign trade and other
related contracts for customers to prevent the company's operational risks.
Contact details: hfr123665@163..com/ +86 182 1952 8852