编委会成员

主编：高文杰

执行主编：尹秀钟

副主编：封海滨、刘怡、车艳梅

编委会成员：王偕林、陈良、李莉、彭杨姗、梁新越、冯妍颖、梁雯雯

本期责编

陈良

本期审校组

刘怡、梁新越、谢娟

投稿要求：就国际法律与实务问题论述充分，严禁抄袭、剽窃，中英文不限，稿件字数在 3000-5000 字（词）为宜。

本刊常年面向境内外法律人士约稿，请各位将文章发送邮件至： guojifalvguancha@163.com（彭杨姗律师）或 skf_lawyer@163.com（苏家辉律师）。

3. 一般来说，要成为法官必须满足基本的标准：必须拥有越南国籍， 忠于国家和宪法；具有良好的道德品质，坚定的政治立场以及捍卫正义的勇气和决心；廉洁诚实；具有法律学士或以上学历；接受过审判方面的专业培训；从事过一定时间的法律专业工作；身体健康，能够履行指定职责。各级法官还有一些特定的标准。

· 人民陪审员制度

4. 与普通法系不同，越南没有陪审团制度。但在每个庭审程序中可以有 2 名人民陪审员参与，并与法官一起组成 3 人审判小组。人民陪审员在普通人中投票选举产生。除简易程序审判之外，人民陪审员应当按照诉讼法的规定参与法院的一审审判。

5. 越南法律规定人民陪审员的资格如下：拥有越南国籍，忠于国家和宪法，具有良好的道德品质，坚定的政治立场，群众中的声誉良好，有捍卫正义的勇气和决心，廉洁诚实；具有法律知识；具有社会知识；身体健康，能够履行指定职责。

· 法院架构

6. 在越南，人民法院的层级主要包括最高人民法院，高级人民法院，省、直辖市法院，城乡地区、省会城市人民法院，以及各级军事法院。

7. 各级法院可分为各类专门法庭，包括民事法庭、经济法庭、劳动法庭、行政法庭、刑事法庭及家事和青少年法庭，各法庭有权审理该专门领域的案件。尽管存在专门法庭，越南法律规定了三种审理程序，即民事程序、刑事程序和行政程序。其中，越南《民事诉讼法》规定的民事诉讼程序适用于所有民事、商业、经济和劳动案件。除前述程序外，并没有适用于专门法庭的特别程序。

· 涉外案件的管辖权

8. 越南法院对于涉外案件，具备一般管辖权，并可以在下列情况中行

使管辖权：(1)被告是在越南长期居住、工作或生活的个人；(2)被告总部设在越南，或被告在越南设有分支机构或代表处且与该分支机构或代表处业务有关的案件；(3)被告在越南拥有财产；(4)离婚案件的原告或被告是越南公民，或是在越南长期居住、工作或生活的外国人；(5)与越南设立、变更或终止民事关系有关的民事案件，其标的是越南境内的财产或越南境内的行为；(6)与越南境外设立、变更或终止民事关系有关的民事案件，涉及越南机构、组织、个人的权利和义务。

9. 一个外国被告可以主张民事关系没有在越南设立、变更或终止，或者没有越南相关方受到损害，因此，其他法院地可能更适合、方便。在这种情况下，越南法院不具有或至少应该拒绝行使管辖权。

10. 即使争议在上述越南法院的一般管辖权范围内，法院仍可能在几种情况下拒绝行使管辖权，例如，当双方同意选择外国法院或仲裁机构，或当案件属于外国法院的排他性管辖范围。然而，如果案件属于越南法院的专属管辖范围(如越南不动产纠纷)，尽管存在其他更适合的诉讼渠道，越南法院仍将对此类案件行使管辖权。

· 送达

11. 采用“非正式”方式，包括邮递或电邮，送达司法文书在技术上不为越南法所禁止，但为降低对外国诉讼程序的风险，若可以，尽可能采用 1965 年《关于向国外送达民事或商事司法文书和司法外文书的公约》(“《海牙公约》”)所规定的方式进行文书的送达。自 2016 年起，越南成为《海牙公约》的缔约国。一般来说，越南的法院和当局可能在以下 2 种情况种提供司法协助(例如，协助送达从越南境外来的文件)：(1)当相关国家与越南之间存在法律协助协议，如《海牙公约》时；(2)当可以适用互惠原则时，互惠原则将视具体情况而定。

12. 如果在越南申请承认和执行外国判决过程中，未获司法协助且文件未能妥善送达居住在越南的当事人或传唤当事人，可能会成为

驳回承认和执行外国判决的理由。

· 诉讼时效

13. 诉讼时效由法律明确规定，因索赔性质和具体情况的不同而有所不同。越南法律中与诉讼时效最相关且经常使用的规定如下：(1)民事索赔，诉讼时效为从权利被侵害方知道或应当知道侵害发生之日起 3 年内；(2)商事索赔和通过商事仲裁解决的索赔，诉讼时效为从权利被侵害方被侵害之日起 2 年内。

· 案件受理

14. 自收到立案材料之日起 5 个工作日内，法院应作出受理案件、移交案件或不予受理的决定。如果案件材料不符合法律要求，法院应通知起诉人，补正期限由法院规定，但不得超过 30 日；在特殊情况下，法院可以延长这一期限，但延长时间不得超过 15 日。法院受理案件后，会向被告送达有关的案件材料，除非法院另行批准，被告应在收到法院通知起 15 日内进行答辩。被告的答辩延期不得超过 15 日。

15. 受理案件后，法院准备审理的时间期限是 2-6 个月。法院在宣布审理案件之日起的 1 个月内将开庭审理。在有正当理由的情况下，这个时间期限可以再延长 2 个月。因此，从立案到开庭，平均需要 6-

8 个月。

· 第三人加入诉讼

16. 在民事诉讼中，被告可以向法院提出申请，请求追加与案件有权利义务关系的人作为第三人加入诉讼，这些人并非原告或被告，但民事案件的解决与其权利义务相关。第三人须经案外人或其他当事人(原告或被告)申请，并法院经审核后，方可加入。

· 集体诉讼

17. 越南法律没有对集体诉讼设置单独的制度或规则。在实践中，如果 一名以上的原告就一个法律关系引起的纠纷对同一被告提起诉讼，或一名原告就一个法律关系对多名被告提起诉讼，法院均仍将按照单个案件的普通程序受理和审理案件。

18. 在民法中，多个个人、团体或组织可以就一种法律关系或多种相互关联的法律关系共同对另一个人、团体或组织提起诉讼。在此种情形下，他们可以选举一名代表参与诉讼以保护他们的合法权益。

19. 越南的集体诉讼主要见于消费者保护、环境问题、劳动纠纷和其他

多个个人或实体受到影响的案件中。

20. 根据《消费者保护法》的规定，社会组织可以在保护消费者权益的民事案件中提起诉讼。此外，一些其他组织也有权提起民事诉讼以保护他人的合法权益、公共利益和国家利益。例如：

（1） 婚姻家事纠纷：人口、家庭和儿童机构以及妇女联合会等在职责范围内，根据《婚姻家庭法》的规定，有权提起与婚姻家事有关的诉讼。

（2） 劳动纠纷：为维护劳动群体的合法权益，基层工会和高级工会均有权就如下纠纷在法院提起并参与诉讼：

a) 工会费用纠纷；

b) 在员工授权的情况下，解决个人劳动争议；

c) 集体权利劳动争议(高级工会为发起人的，须经基层工会

授权)；

d) 请求法院宣告劳动合同、劳资谈判协议无效的纠纷；

e) 请求法院评估罢工的合法性的纠纷；

f) 除上述事项外，上级工会和基层工会应法院和/或职工的要求，可以派代表参加劳动纠纷解决过程。

21. 其他机构和组织有权在职责范围内提起民事诉讼，请求法院保护

其职责范围内的公共利益和国家利益。

· 庭前会议

22. 庭前会议由法院主持，目的在于审查证据交换情况(或者说是确保各方在庭审前收到了对方提交的或法院收集到的所有证据)，确定庭审准备情况，以及组织各方调解。

23. 该会议需要在审理准备阶段召开，法院应当在该阶段结束后一个月(或者至多两个月)内作出开庭通知。实践中，法院通常会在该会议结束后立即作出，因此，该会议通常在庭前一个月进行。

· 证据规则

24. 根据越南《民事诉讼法》规定，在民事案件进行过程中，当事人有权利和义务向法院提交相关证据，以证明其诉讼请求是有根据和合法的。如果当事人有义务提交证据，但并未提交或未能提交充分的证据，法院将根据案件卷宗中可用的证据材料审理案件。当一方当事人向法院提交证据时，该方当事人还必须向其他当事人提供上述证据的副本。如果无法制作该证据的副本，则必须向其他当事人发送书面通知。

25. 在实践中，各方不会被强制要求提交或披露相关文件，法院只基于当事人提交的证据进行审理，但除法律另有规定，当事人必须承担拒不举证或举证不足的法律后果。一方当事人无需直接向其他当事人进行证据披露(尽管各方通常需履行向其他当事人提供所提交文件副本的义务)，但任一方当事人都有权阅读、记录、复制其他各方提交给法院的文件和证据。

26. 在当事人已采取必要措施收集证据但未果的情况下，该方可以：(1)请求法院作出决定，要求保管或管理该证据的机构、组织或个人提供证据；(2)请求法院收集证据以确保妥善解决民事案件。法院可根据当事人申请或在认为必要的情况下作出决定，要求保管或管理证据的机构、组织或个人提供证据，相关机构、组织或个人应在收到通知之日起的十五日内，根据法院的要求提供证据。

27. 除越南《民事诉讼法》另有规定外，每一项证据均应平等地向各方

披露并供各方使用。

28. 在刑事案件中，主管机关将根据《刑事诉讼法》开展取证活动，可以要求其他机关和实体提供与案件解决有关的证据、文件、物品、电子数据和事实。此外，辩护律师可以：(1)通过询问被告人、被害人、证人和其他了解案件的个人的方式收集证据；(2)请求机关和实体提供与辩护有关的文件、物品和电子数据。

29. 越南法下对特权(privilege) 的概念或含义没有明确的规定。关于防止秘密信息泄露，《民事诉讼法》和其他法规相关规定如下：(1)证人有权拒绝作出与专业秘密、商业秘密、个人秘密有关的证词，或此类证词将对有关方及其近亲属造成不利的后果和损害；(2)法庭负有在合理要求下保护上市人的秘密(例如商业秘密、个人信息)的一般义务，这项义务可能以不公开审理或案件中不披露/公布相关文件的形式体现；(3)除非得到客户的明确确认或法律规定，律师必须遵守对客户的信息严格保密的基本原则。各方当事人可就秘密信息保护向法院提出申请，法院将决定是否提供相关保护措施防止秘密信息泄露。

30. 若外国有关机构通过《海牙公约》所规定的方式或基于互惠原则的外交途径请求调取在越南证据，将可能获准。

· 证人证言

31. 根据越南《民事诉讼法》，如果当事人未提供证词或证词内容不完整或不清楚，法官可以当庭询问。此外，法官可以根据当事人申请或认为必要时在庭上或接收当事人的证词。根据当事人的请求，或在当事人、证人的证词被认为不一致时，法官可以安排各当事人之间、当事人与证人之间、证人之间的交叉询问。

32. 越南《民事诉讼法》未强制要求庭前提交证人证言。在实践中，证人证词可以在庭审中提交。

· 专家证人

33. 专家证人可以根据当事人之间达成的协议挑选，也可以根据一个

或多个当事人的请求由法院指定。如有必要，法院可就某一特定问题指定一名有资质的专家，该专家可以是受法官委托在证据审查中发表意见的司法专家，也可以是受邀进行财产估值或财产价格评估的专家。越南法律未对专家证据的可采信标准作出特别规定。

34. 越南法律未明确要求当事各方之间必须交换专家报告或书面摘要。但原则上，当一方当事人向法院提交证据时，该当事人必须将这些 证据的副本发送给其他当事人。对于无法复制的证据，必须向其他当事人发送书面通知。在实践中，如果一方当事人向法院提交专家报告或书面摘要，法院将通知另一方当事人，并允许该方当事人复制这些提交的材料。

· 庭审

35. 在庭审开始后，如果当事人未能就纠纷达成协议，当事人将有权在一定时间陈述案情。陈述按照原告、被告、利益相关方的顺序相继进行。陈述的具体形式和时长将以法官的指示为准。

36. 证人出庭作证，应当先行陈述，关于证人陈述的顺序，并没有特定的规则或指引。陈述完毕后，留在法庭接受进一步询问。有多个证人的，法官将分别对每个证人进行询问。根据越南《民事诉讼法》的规定，法官询问证人的问题顺序如下：(1)主审法官在询问证人前，必须明确询问证人与当事人的关系；证人为未成年人的，主审法官可以请求其父母、监护人或教师协助询问；(2)主审法官将要求证人清楚地陈述他/她知道的事情的细节。证人陈述完毕后，法官应仅就其陈述不清楚或不充分、相互矛盾，或与他/她先前的证词、或与有关各方或保护这些人的合法权利和义务的人的陈述相矛盾的事项进行询问。

37. 在有必要确保证人及其近亲属安全的情况下，合议庭可以决定不

披露证人的个人身份信息，并在庭审中不让旁听人员看到他们。

38. 审理与询问由主审法官主持。询问顺序按照原告、被告、利益相关

方、其他参加诉讼的人、主审法官、人民陪审员、检察官的顺序进

行。

39. 在民事案件中，法庭询问环节和质证环节结束后，将会进行法庭辩论。发表辩论意见的顺序按照原告、被告、利益相关方的顺序进行。此后，根据主审法院的指示，庭审可以继续进行。当事人可以就被询问的具体事项发表意见。辩论意见须基于法庭审理环节质证后的证据及询问环节中得出的结果而作出，一方可对对方的辩论意见作出回应。

40. 若案情简单、文书完整、证据确凿，人民法院可以在网上审理符合条件的刑事、民事、行政案件的一审和上诉案件，被告人、被害人等诉讼参与人可以在法院决定的法庭以外的地点参与庭审，但涉及国家秘密，侵犯国家安全、破坏和平、危害人类、战争犯罪的刑事案件不得网上审理。

· 举证责任

41. 在民事案件中，通常主张损害赔偿的一方应承担责任、因果关系和损害的举证责任。对另一方诉讼请求进行抗辩的当事人，必须证明其抗辩具备理由，并提供证据证明这些理由。

42. 在民事和商事案件中，只有在满足以下所有要件的情况下，才构成损害赔偿责任：(1)存在违反法律或合同的行为；(2)产生实际损失； (3)违约行为与损失之间存在直接因果关系。

· 损害赔偿

43. 损失赔偿和判决前利息在所有民事案件中都可获得支持，但根据越南法律，只有已经发生的，直接的和实质性的损失才可以获得支持。损失的价值包括受害方因违约方的违约遭受的实际和直接损失的价值，以及如果没有违约受害方的预期利润损失。

44. 根据越南法律，惩罚性赔偿无法获得支持。越南法律允许双方约定一个固定数额的罚款(其价值最高可以相当于被侵犯价值的 8%)，这是与损害赔偿不同的单独救济，具有惩罚性质。

45. 如果原告在造成损害方面也具有过错，造成损害的对方只需承担 与其过错相当的赔偿金；如果原告具有完全过错，则对方不必赔偿。

· 诉讼费用

46. 根据法律规定，败诉方必须承担诉讼费。如果一方当事人的诉讼请 求被部分支持，该方当事人应按照法院不支持的部分承担诉讼费，对方当事人按照法院支持该方当事人诉讼请求的比例承担诉讼费。

47. 如果双方当事人不能确定他们在共有财产中的份额，并请求法院分割共有财产，则各方当事人应按各自享有的财产份额价值承担相应的诉讼费用。

48. 如果案件达成和解结案，各方当事人需承担 50%的诉讼费用。

49. 离婚案件的原告必须支付诉讼费用，无论法院是否支持其诉讼请求。在双方当事人自愿协议离婚的情况下，各方当事人各承担一半的诉讼费用。

50. 根据《法院费用条例》，诉讼费用的数额取决于争议金额。商业纠

纷案件的诉讼费用应按以下方式计算：

（a） 商业纠纷案件的一审诉讼费²：

2 本节人民币金额根据本文发表日期的汇率估算得出.

（b） 法院费用：20 万越南盾(约 60 元人民币)。

51. 需要注意的是，胜诉方的其他诉讼费用和成本(例如律师费)并不会得到支持。除非另有约定，律师费或翻译费将根据当事人与律师或翻译之间的协议约定而承担。

52. 在越南，对第三方资助诉讼尚未有相关法律规定或实践。

· 律师及律师费

53. 越南律师并未作事务律师和出庭律师之分，获得执业资格的律师

均可以从事诉讼或非诉业务。

54. 越南法律并未禁止律师收取风险代理费，费用安排取决于律师和客户之间签订的法律服务合同。律师被禁止在案件胜诉后，向客户索取法律服务合同中未约定的额外费用或奖金。但如果客户自愿奖励律师，则此种费用收取是被允许的。

55. 在刑事案件中，如果律师是应承办机构的请求参与诉讼程序，其一天的报酬是政府规定的基本工资的 0.4 倍。

· 上诉

56. 当事人有权对一审法院的判决提起上诉。对于当事人提出上诉的理由，法律并未进行规定。因此，当事人可以仅因为不同意一审判决而提起上诉。上诉人必须在判决宣告之日起 15 日内向一审法院提出上诉。直属上级法院将根据上诉程序对案件进行重新审理。

二、 仲裁

57. 在越南，仲裁同样是解决商业纠纷的一种选择。如果当事人双方达成符合越南法律的书面仲裁协议，双方可选择仲裁进行争议解决。仲裁协议既可以独立于基础合同，也可以是基础合同中的一项条

款。仲裁协议可订立于争议发生之前，也可订立于争议发生之后。除仲裁协议约定外，各仲裁中心适用各自的仲裁规则管理仲裁程序；若仲裁庭决定和当事人同意，仲裁程序可参照适用其他国际规则或指南(例如《国际律师协会国际仲裁利益冲突指引》、《国际律师协会国际仲裁取证规则》)。

58. 然而，只有当相关争议属于可仲裁的范畴时，仲裁才能成为一种选择，可仲裁案件的范围主要包括：(1)当事人之间因商业活动产生的纠纷；(2)当事人中至少一方是从事商业活动而产生的纠纷；(3)法律明确规定可以以仲裁方式解决的其他纠纷。但某些类型的争议属于越南法院和其他机构的专属管辖范围，例如劳动争议、婚姻争议和在越南境内涉及不动产物权的争议。

59. 对于国内争议，越南最可靠的仲裁中心是越南国际仲裁中心 (VIAC)。对于涉外争议，通常可能选择的国际仲裁中心包括越南国际仲裁中心、新加坡国际仲裁中心(SIAC)和国际商会国际仲裁院 (ICC)。

60. 越南的仲裁法律框架主要包括：《商事仲裁法》(例如，有关撤销国内仲裁裁决的规定)及其指导性法规，该法在很大程度上以联合国《国际商事仲裁示范法》(UNCINTRAL Model Law)为基础；1958年《纽约公约》和《民事诉讼法》(有关承认和执行外国仲裁裁决的规定)。

61. 根据《商事仲裁法》的规定，如果争议各方已达成仲裁协议，若其中一方当事人提起诉讼，除非仲裁协议无效或无法履行，法院须拒绝受理该案件。

三、 调解

62. 越南法院的绝大多数诉讼案件都会在开庭前进行调解，但以下两种案件除外：(1)请求赔偿国家财产损失；(2)因违反法律禁止性规定或违背社会伦理的民事交易所引起的案件。

63. 如果当事各方能够在调解阶段就相关争议达成协议，法院将承认

该协议，并基于该协议作出判决。如果各方未能达成协议，法院将开庭并对案件作出判决。需要注意的是，法院的调解努力仅限于鼓励当事人和解(若可能)。诉讼期间的调解通常并不规范，也并非由经专业训练的调解员主持。

64. 根据争议的性质，例如某些劳动纠纷或涉及土地使用的纠纷，庭前调解为必经程序。此外，如果当事各方就各等诉前程序另有约定，则当事各方必须遵守其约定。大多数民事案件没有诉前程序，当管辖法院受理案件之时，民事诉讼程序便开始进行。

四、 司法体系改革

65. 目前，越南正在进行司法改革，《民事诉讼法》及相关法律规范会进一步修订更新，以促进各等规范在司法活动中有效实施，提高人民法院工作质量、效率和声誉。

Taking stock of the recognition of crypto assets as a form of property by the Singapore courts

Lau Wen Jin (刘玟进) Dentons Rodyk

Lau Wen Jin (刘玟进)

LLB (Summa) (Singapore Management University); LLM (International Arbitration and Dispute Resolution) (National University of Singapore); Master of Advanced

Studies (LL.M.) in International Dispute Settlement (MIDS) (Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement); Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); Partner, Dentons Rodyk.

Note: The views stated in this article are entirely the author’s own and does not represent the view of his firm or other lawyers of the firm.

Introduction

The Singapore courts have adjudicated several cases involving crypto assets (both cryptocurrencies and non-fungible tokens), and the common issue that arose in all these cases was: Is the relevant crypto asset a form of property? In such cases, the claimants have invariably sought a remedy from the Singapore court by asserting a right under law in relation to the relevant crypto asset, and that right would be premised on the position that the crypto asset involved was a form of property that was recognised by the law.

This article surveys the four decisions in which the Singapore courts have examined the issue of whether crypto assets should be recognised as a form of property. The first three cases laid down the foundation by pointing in favour of recognition of crypto assets as a form of property, though not definitively. That trend culminated in the judgment in ByBit Fintech Limited v Ho Kai Xin [2023] SGHC 199 (“ByBit Fintech v Ho Kai Xin”) (released on 27 July 2023), which is revolutionary because it is the first

judgment in Singapore to have conclusively recognised cryptocurrencies as a form of property. The significance of this decision is that the court has decided that it could grant proprietary remedies in respect of cryptocurrencies. Hence, in respect of cryptocurrencies which have been stolen, the High Court in this case imposed a constructive trust over those stolen assets such that the defendant held those assets on trust for the claimant, and the claimant could trace the proceeds of those stolen assets. These decisions are demonstrative of the incremental nature of the common law system, which courts consider and establish legal principles on a case-by-case basis, as part of a continuous dialogue not only amongst the courts within Singapore, but foreign courts within the Commonwealth, as can be seen from the references to those decisions. The decision also demonstrates flexibility of the common law to extend existing principles to assimilate cryptocurrencies (a new asset class) into the general concepts of property under common law, without the need for legislative intervention or permission. Each of the four cases will be presented below in chronological order.

First case of the series: Quoine Pte Ltd v B2C2 Ltd [2020] 2 SLR 20.

In Quoine Pte Ltd v B2C2 Ltd [2020] 2 SLR 20 (“Quoine v B2C2”), the Singapore Court of Appeal considered the issue of whether cryptocurrency, specifically BTC, was a species of property that is capable of being held on trust. The Court of Appeal surveyed relevant foreign cases and academic writing on this issue, but ultimately found that it was not necessary to decide on this issue as the claimant succeeded on a more straightforward contractual claim and the alternative argument based on trust failed on other reasons. Nevertheless, the case provides useful insights of the Court’s considerations regarding this issue.

Quoine was the operator of a cryptocurrency exchange platform (“the Platform”). Quoine also functioned as a market-maker on the Platform by placing buy and sell orders to create liquidity. Quoine conducted its market-making trades through its “Quoter Program”.

B2C2 was a trader on the Platform at the material time. B2C2 traded using its own

algorithmic trading software (“the Trading Software”). The Trading Software was

designed to function with minimal human intervention, and would always produce the same output given the same input. The inputs to the Trading Software would be used to generate quotes for sale and purchase orders on the Platform. In particular, the inputs were to be the best 20 orders from the Platform. There was also a fail-safe “deep price” of 10 Bitcoin (“BTC”) to 1 Ethereum (“ETH”) built into the algorithm, which would be invoked should input data from the Platform be unavailable.

In 2017, Quoter Program’s failed to generate new orders because of Quoine’s oversight in making certain necessary changes to the Platform’s critical operating systems. This triggered the deep price in the Trading Software to take effect such that B2C2’s sell orders were matched with the buy orders of two other traders (“the Counterparties”). In particular, due to the Quoter Program’s failure to generate new orders, that caused the Platform’s order book to be “abnormally thin” such that the Platform triggered margin calls against the Counterparties and automatically force-closed their positions by placing market orders to buy ETH at the best available price on the Platform (which was B2C2’s deep price sell order).

Hence, 13 trades (“the Disputed Trades”) were concluded between B2C2 (which bought BTC) and the Counterparties (which sold BTC) at a rate of 10 BTC for 1 ETH. These rates were approximately 250 times the then going rate in the market of around 0.04 BTC for 1 ETH. In other words, B2C2 bought BTC at a rate which was 250 times lower than the market price, and the Counterparties paid 250 times more for the ETH it bought from B2C2.

The Disputed Trades were automatically settled by the Platform, with BTC debited from the Counterparties’ accounts and credited into B2C2’s account, and ETH debited from B2C2’s account and credited into the Counterparties’ accounts. When Quoine became aware of the Disputed Trades the next day, it unilaterally cancelled the Disputed Trades and reversed the settlement transactions on the basis that these trades were concluded at highly abnormal rates.

B2C2 commenced proceedings against Quoine alleging that its unilateral cancellation of the Disputed Trades and reversal of the settlement transactions were in (a) breach of contract or (b) breach of trust.

In relation to B2C2’s claim on breach of contract, the Singapore Court of Appeal held that Quoine’s unilateral cancellation of the Disputed Trades and reversal of the settlement transactions were in breach of contract (in particular, in breach of the Irreversible Action Clause) and there was no term (express or implied) in the platform agreement which allowed Quoine to cancel the Disputed Trades. The Court also rejected Quoine’s defences that it was entitled to cancel the Disputed Trades because that the relevant trading contracts were void on the basis of unilateral mistake at common law, or unilateral mistake in equity. Under Singapore contract law, a contract can be void (ie, the contract never existed) on the basis of unilateral mistake only if certain requirements were met, and those requirements were not met in this case.

In relation to B2C2’s alternative claim based on trust, B2C2 argued that Quoine was holding the BTC which was credited into B2C2’s account pursuant to the Disputed Trades on trust and that Quoine breached that trust when it reversed that credit transaction. The significance of such an argument is that if Quoine were holding the BTC on trust for B2C2, the “real” owner of the BTC had always been B2C2 (because Quoine would merely be holding the legal interest of the BTC, whereas the equitable interest remained to be held by B2C2). Accordingly, Quoine as trustee would not be at liberty to deal with the BTC to the detriment of B2C2. In reversing that credit transaction, Quoine would have committed a breach of trust, and Quoine would be liable to B2C2 for that breach. This argument was raised by B2C2 so that it would still have a claim against Quoine in the event B2C2 is unsuccessful in its claim for breach of contract for whatever reason.

This alternative claim by B2C2 based on trust raised the threshold issue of whether cryptocurrency, specifically BTC, was even a species of property that is capable of being held on trust.

The Court of Appeal held that no express trust arose over the BTC in B2C2’s account because there was no certainty of intention to create a trust (because the manner in which BTC was stored by Quoine suggested there was no segregation of the BTC). More relevantly, on the issue of whether cryptocurrencies were a species of property, the Court observed that some cases in the Commonwealth have implicitly accepted that

cryptocurrencies as property?” (2017) 9(2) Law, Innovation and Technology 235 (available at https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2806), where the authors argue that the property right relating to BTC is the right to have one’s public BTC address appear as the last entry in the blockchain in relation to a particular BTC. Such a right provides exclusive control to the holder in the form of universal exigibility and can be seen as involving a true property transfer when one transfers BTC from one’s public BTC address to another’s BTC address.”

The Court also referred to the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce (“UKJT”) “Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts” (November 2019), where it concluded that crypto assets could be treated, in principle, as property:⁷

“Most recently, the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce (“UKJT”) chaired by Sir Geoffrey Vos released its “Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts” (November 2019), where it considered the question of whether English law would treat a particular cryptoasset as property. The UKJT defined cryptoassets as generally having the following characteristics (at para 31): (a) intangibility; (b) cryptographic authentication; (c) use of a distributed transaction ledger; (d) decentralisation; and (e) rule by consensus. The UKJT stated (at para 85) that cryptoassets have all the indicia of property, and that their novel or distinctive features as aforementioned do not disqualify them from being property. The UKJT also stated that cryptoassets are not disqualified from being property simply because they might not be classifiable either as things in possession or as things in action. The UKJT therefore concluded that cryptoassets could be treated, in principle, as property.”

Having considered the issue, the Court stated that there may be “much to commend” the view that cryptocurrencies should be capable of assimilation into the general concepts of property, but that there remained “difficult questions as to the type of property that is involved”. The Court ultimately found that it was not necessary to come

to a final position on this question given that B2C2’s breach of trust claim failed on the basis of the lack of certainty of intention to create a trust.⁸

Therefore, while the Court of Appeal’s passing comments indicated that it was leaning towards finding that cryptocurrencies could be property, it took a rather restrained position by stopping short of ruling on that question. This issue was left open to be considered comprehensively at a more appropriate case later.

Second case of the series: CLM v CLN and others [2022] 5 SLR 273

The next case of CLM v CLN and others [2022] 5 SLR 273 (“CLM v CLN”) involves the claimant’s application to freeze certain crypto assets which were stolen from him by certain unknown persons. The application was heard in Singapore because the stolen crypto assets were traced to digital wallets that were controlled by cryptocurrency exchanges with operations in Singapore

In that case, the claimant had stored cryptocurrency (109.83 Bitcoin (“BTC”) and 1497.54 Ethereum (“ETH”)) in two separate digital wallets that were accessible through a free mobile application secured with a password. The wallets employed recovery seeds that could be used to recover the password if the mobile phone was lost or destroyed.

The claimant and seven acquaintances went on vacation at his apartment in Mexico. One night, the claimant and one acquaintance went out while the rest of the group remained at his apartment. As the claimant needed some money, he called one member of the group at his apartment and requested that member to retrieve some cash that he had kept in a safe. The claimant then read the safe combination over the phone. The claimant claimed that some other members of the group were in the same room while two other members were in a nearby bedroom, and they could hear the safe combination being said out loud. This safe contained the recovery seeds for his wallets. The next night, the claimant found that the BTC and ETH were withdrawn from his wallets without his knowledge or consent (the “Stolen Cryptocurrency Assets”).

The claimant then commenced the court proceedings to trace and recover the Stolen Cryptocurrency Assets that were allegedly misappropriated from him by unidentified persons (ie, the first defendant), a portion of which had been traced to digital wallets that were controlled by cryptocurrency exchanges with operations in Singapore (ie, the second and third defendants).

In an application for interlocutory orders pending final determination of the court proceedings, the claimant sought, amongst other things, a proprietary injunction prohibiting the first defendants from dealing with, disposing of, or diminishing the value of the Stolen Cryptocurrency Assets. By way of explanation, an “injunction” is a judgment or court order to do or refrain from doing a particular thing. It is also either

(a) restraining or prohibitory, ie, when it inhibits the doing of anything; or (b) mandatory, ie, when it commands the doing, or restoring, of anything. “Interlocutory Injunction” means an injunction made prior to the final disposal of the suit or action, ie, at the interlocutory stage of the suit or action. The purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the rights of the claimant, pending the final determination of rights by the court after trial, so as to protect the claimant against violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages if the claimant succeeds at trial. Hence, in this case, the claimant sought an injunction to prevent the defendants from dealing with, disposing of, or diminishing the value of the Stolen Cryptocurrency Assets, pending the substantive trial of the merits of the case so as to preserve his right. Otherwise, if the defendants could dispose of the Stolen Cryptocurrency Assets before the final determination of the matter at trial, any final judgment rendered by the court after the substantive trial would not be meaningfully enforced against the assets which have already been dissipated. Therefore, it should be emphasised that this judgment was not made in the context of a trial of a substantive merits in which full consideration of the legal issues would be given, but made on an application for an interlocutory injunction in which a lower standard was to be satisfied instead, ie, a serious arguable case.

In determining this application, the Singapore High Court had to consider whether the

Stolen Cryptocurrency Assets, being cryptocurrency, were capable of giving rise to proprietary rights which could be protected via a proprietary injunction. This is because

a proprietary injunction is an injunction that fastens on the specific asset in which the claimant asserts a proprietary interest. The Court referred to the classic definition of a property right in National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (“Ainsworth”) at 1248: “it must be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties, and have some degree of permanence or stability”.

The Court ruled that cryptocurrencies satisfied the definition of a property right in Ainsworth. In doing so, the Court referred to the New Zealand case of Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in liq) [2020] 2 NZLR 809 (“Ruscoe”), where the High Court also held that cryptocurrencies satisfied the four requirements set out in Ainsworth to be considered a species of “property”. In this regard, the court in Ruscoe examined the four requirements in Ainsworth in turn:⁹

(a) The first requirement is that the right must be “definable” – the asset must hence be capable of being isolated from other assets whether of the same type or of other types and thereby identified. To this end, cryptocurrencies are computer-readable strings of characters which are recorded on networks of computers established for the purpose of recording those strings, and are sufficiently distinct to be capable of then being allocated to an account holder on that particular network.

(b) The second requirement is that the right must be “identifiable by third parties”, which requires that the asset must have an owner being capable of being recognised as such by third parties. An important indicator is whether the owner has the power to exclude others from using or benefiting from the asset. In this vein, excludability is achieved in respect of cryptocurrencies by the computer software allocating the owner with a private key, which is required to record a transfer of the cryptocurrency from one account to another.

9 CLM v CLN and others [2022] 5 SLR 273 at [44] to [46].

(c) The third requirement is that the right must be “capable of assumption by third parties”, which in turn involves two aspects: that third parties must respect the rights of the owner in that asset, and that the asset must be potentially desirable. The fact that these two aspects are met by cryptocurrencies, is evidenced by the fact that many cryptocurrencies, certainly BTC and ETH, are the subject of active trading markets.

(d) The fourth requirement is that the right and in turn, the asset, must have “some degree of permanence or stability”, although this is a low threshold since a “ticket to a football match which can have a very short life yet unquestionably it is regarded as property”. In this respect, the blockchain methodology which cryptocurrency systems deploy provides stability to cryptocurrencies, and a particular cryptocurrency token stays fully recognised, in existence and stable unless and until it is spent through the use of the private key, which may never happen.

Since the Singapore High Court ruled that cryptocurrencies satisfied the definition of a property right in Ainsworth, the claimant was able to prove a serious arguable case that the Stolen Cryptocurrency Assets were capable of giving rise to proprietary rights, which could be protected via a proprietary injunction.¹⁰ The Court reiterated that since this was only an interlocutory application (in contradistinction to a final determination of the merits of the case), the Court did not engage in complex questions of law or fact at this stage of the proceedings. This case is aligned with the sentiments of the Court of Appeal stated in Quoine v B2C2, but goes one step further in holding that crypto assets are capable of giving rise to proprietary rights, at least in the context of an interlocutory application.

Third case of the series: Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2023] 3 SLR 1191

The case of Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2023] 3 SLR

1191 (“Janesh v Unknown Person”) also relates to an application for an interlocutory injunction, just as in CLM v CLN, but concerns a different crypto asset known as Non- Fungible Tokens (“NFTs”). While both NFTs and cryptocurrencies are tokens on a blockchain, the difference is that cryptocurrencies from the same blockchain are interchangeable, whereas two NFTs from the same blockchain are not interchangeable. This is because each NFT is assigned a unique token ID.

In this case, the claimant was the owner of an NFT known as the Bored Ape Yacht Club (“BAYC”) ID #2162 (the “Bored Ape NFT”). The Bored Ape NFT was part of a collection of 10,000 other pieces of artwork depicting apes with different unique attributes. The NFTs within the BAYC collection were hugely popular, and owned by a number of celebrities, including Justin Bieber. Each NFT within the BAYC collection was minted on the Ethereum blockchain with an individual, and unique hash number recorded on the blockchain together with a unique token ID which served as publicly verifiable proof of its provenance.¹¹

The claimant was a regular user on “NFTfi”, which was a community platform functioning as an NFT-collateralised cryptocurrency lending marketplace. He would often enter into loan transactions with other users to borrow cryptocurrencies with NFTs as collateral. One NFT he would use as collateral was a Bored Ape NFT.

Because the Bored Ape NFT was extremely precious to the claimant, for every loan transaction in which he used the Bored Ape NFT as collateral, he was careful to state specific terms as part of the loan agreement which ensured that while the claimant was entitled to use the Bored Ape NFT as collateral, lenders whom he transacted with would not be able to take control or claim ownership over the NFT.

The dispute arose out of a loan transaction which the claimant had entered into with the defendant, who went by the pseudonym “chefpierre.eth”. The claimant asked for a short extension of time to repay the loan and the defendant agreed. Two days later, the defendant agreed to the Claimant’s proposal to enter into a refinancing loan – the outstanding amount owed under the current loan would be deducted from fresh funds provided to the claimant. The defendant, however, changed his mind and refused to

11 Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2023] 3 SLR 1191 at [6] to [9].

enter into the refinancing loan, insisting that the current loan be repaid in full. The claimant was caught offguard, and the defendant transferred the Bored Ape NFT which was held in NFTfi’s escrow account into his cryptocurrency wallet. The Bored Ape NFT was later listed for sale on “OpenSea” (an online NFT marketplace). The claimant commenced action the defendant, and also took out an application for a proprietary injunction (which again, is an interlocutory application pending final determination of the merits of the case) over the Bored Ape NFT.

As part of determining the application for a proprietary injunction over the Bored Ape NFT, the Singapore High Court had to consider whether the Bored Ape NFT, or NFTs in general, were capable of giving rise to proprietary rights which could be protected by an interlocutory injunction. The Court held that that such NFTs did satisfy the Ainsworth criteria:¹²

(a) The first Ainsworth criteria is that the right must be “definable” – essentially, the asset “must hence be capable of being isolated from other assets whether of the same type or of other types and thereby identified”. This requirement was easily fulfilled as the metadata is central to an NFT. It is this metadata which distinguishes one NFT from another.

(b) The second requirement is that the “asset must have an owner being capable of being recognised as such by third parties”. Where NFTs are concerned, the presumptive owner would be whoever controls the wallet which is linked to the NFT. Similar to cryptocurrencies, excludability is achieved because one cannot deal with the NFT without the owner’s private key.

(c) The third requirement is that “the right must be capable of assumption by third parties, which in turn involves two aspects: that third parties must respect the rights of the owner in that asset, and that the asset must be potentially desirable”. The Court found that these requirements would be met. First, the nature of the blockchain technology gives the owner the exclusive ability to transfer the NFT to another party, which underscores the “right” of the owner. Secondly, such NFTs are clearly the subject of active trading in the markets.

12 Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2023] 3 SLR 1191 at [69] to [72].

(d) The fourth, and final, requirement is that the “right and in turn, the asset”, must have “some degree of permanence or stability”, although this is a low threshold since a “ticket to a football match which can have a very short life yet unquestionably it is regarded as property”. The NFT concerned has as much permanence and stability as money in bank accounts which, nowadays, exist mainly in the form of ledger entries and not cold hard cash.

It should be noted that the High Court in this case has merely found that NFTs in general were capable of giving rise to proprietary rights which could be protected by an interlocutory proprietary injunction, which is an injunction in the interim pending final determination of the merits of the case (whether in the form of summary judgment or in the form of a trial). The High Court did not have to and did not make a conclusive finding that NFTs are a form of property. To this extent, this is similar to the case of CLM v CLN. The significance of this case is that the recognition of crypto assets as property (at least provisionally in an interlocutory application) is not limited to cryptocurrencies such as BTC but extends to broader crypto assets, namely, NFTs.

Fourth case of the series: ByBit Fintech Limited v Ho Kai Xin [2023] SGHC 1999

The development in Singapore case law regarding recognition of crypto assets as property culminated in the Singapore High Court case of ByBit Fintech v Ho Kai Xin (released on 27 July 2023), which as stated above, is revolutionary as it is the first judgment in Singapore to conclusively recognise cryptocurrencies as a form of property, and hence merits closer consideration.

The facts:

ByBit owns its namesake cryptocurrency exchange. WeChain provides payroll services for ByBit. Ms Ho was employed by WeChain and was responsible for the payroll processing of ByBit’s employees, who were paid by traditional currency, cryptocurrency, or a mixture of both.

As part of her duties, Ms Ho maintained Microsoft Excel spreadsheets which tracked the cash and cryptocurrency payments due to ByBit’s employees each month (“Excel

Files”). The Excel Files list the “Address” (in the form of a unique string of alpha numerals) designated by ByBit’s employees for the receipt of cryptocurrency payments. A corresponding “Private Key” is required to access and authorize transfers between Addresses, and these Private Keys are in turn stored in “Wallets”. Hence, access to a Wallet grants access to the stored Private Key which provide control over an Address and thus the cryptocurrency stored therein.

ByBit discovered certain unusual payments of 4.2 million USDT (“the Crypto Asset”) which have been made to four Addresses (“Anomalous Transactions”). These transactions involve large payments of a crypto asset called Tether. Tether is an example of a stable coin. By this it is meant that its issuer represents that it backs each stable coin issued with an equivalent value in fiat currency. For the case of Tether, it is linked to United States Dollars. Hence, Tether is commonly referred to as United States Dollar Tether (USDT).

ByBit commenced action against Ms Ho, and secured interim relief, including a worldwide freezing order against Ms Ho and a proprietary injunction in respect of the USDT in the four Addresses.

Ms Ho’s defence was that even though the Crypto Asset belonged to ByBit, her cousin (“Jason”) accessed her work laptop without her knowledge and transferred the Crypto Asset to the four Addresses which were owned and controlled by Jason alone.

ByBit applied for summary judgment against Ms Ho on the basis that it has proven a prima facie case against Mr Ho, and Ms Ho had no defence to the claim. ByBit made the following submissions:

1. Jason was an outright fabrication because Ms Ho had no evidence supporting Jason’s existence and her version of events was inherently implausible. Contemporaneous with the Anomalous Transactions, Ms Ho also engaged in a suspicious luxury spending spree, spending approximately S$360,000 on a new car, S$30,000 on Louis Vuitton products, and purchased a penthouse valued at approximately S$3.7m. Moreover, disclosure of information from the service provider of the Wallet for one of the four addresses revealed that Ms Ho owned that Wallet.

2. The Crypto Asset was property capable of being the subject matter of a trust because it comprised of choses in action.

3. Ms Ho held the Crypto Asset as constructive trustee, or alternatively, that Ms Ho was unjustly enriched.

Issues to be determined:

The High Court had to decide these 2 issues:

1. whether USDT was property capable of being held on trust (“Issue 1”); and

2. whether ByBit is entitled to summary judgment (“Issue 2”).

High Court's decision on Issue 1: USDT was property capable of being held on trust

The High Court held that USDT was property capable of being held on trust. In fact, the High Court appeared to have made a broader ruling that a holder of a crypto asset has in principle an incorporate right of property recognizable by the common law as a chose in action (or thing in action).

First, the High Court held that crypto assets can be defined and identified by modern humans, such that they can be traded and valued as holdings, and they satisfied the 4 criteria for property: (a) definable; (b) identifiable by third parties; (c) capable in its nature of assumption by third parties; and (d) have some degree of permanence or stability (laid down in National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1965] 1 AC 1175).

The reasons are as follows:

1. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) has recently issued a consultation paper on proposed amendments to the payment services regulations that would implement segregation and custody requirements for digital payment tokens. These proposed amendments reflect the reality that it is possible in practice to identify and segregate such digital assets, and hence support the view that it should be legally possible to hold them on trust.

2. General recognition has been given to cryptocurrency as property in Singapore's

procedural rules (ie, the Rules of Court). In particular, cryptocurrency has been expressly recognised as a form of property capable of being the subject matter

of an enforcement order because Order 22 r 1(1) defines “movable property” to include "cryptocurrency or other digital currency".

3. Crypto assets do manifest themselves in the physical world. In particular, the combination of Private Key with Public Key unlocks the previous cryptographic lock and in turn locks the unspent transaction output of the crypto asset to the holder’s public Address on the blockchain. Even though this physical manifestation at the level of digital bits and bytes is not permanent, and changes with every transaction, we identify what is going on as a particular digital token.

4. While some people are sceptical of the value of crypto assets, value is not inherent in an object, but a judgment made by an aggregate of human minds (which varies with circumstances).

Second, the High Court held that crypto assets can be classified as choses in action. The Court noted that choses in action originated as rights enforceable by action (in the sense of litigation in court) against persons (such as the right to be paid money or debts, or contractual rights), but there is no individual counterparty to the crypto holder’s right. However, over time, the category of choses of action has expended to include incorporeal rights such as copyrights. This shows that the category of choses in action is broad, flexible, and not closed.

While the terms of service for USDT provide for a contractual right of redemption such that its issuer represents that it backs each USDT issued with an equivalent value United States Dollars (enforceable by way of suit against Tether Limited), the Court noted that this feature was not necessary to its conclusion that USDT is itself a chose in action.

High Court's decision on Issue 2: ByBit was entitled to summary judgment

The Court granted summary judgment against Ms Ho. The reasons are as follows:

1. From the totality of the evidence, Jason does not exist (or did not play the role asserted for him by Ms Ho).

2. The evidence was indeed compelling that Ms Ho fraudulently transferred the Crypto Asset to herself. There was the direct evidence that Ms Ho owned the

Wallet associated with one of the Four Addresses, as well as the circumstantial evidence of her unexplained spending spree.

Accordingly, the Court declared a constructive trust over the Crypto Asset (and other stolen fiat monies), and that ByBit was the legal and beneficial owner of the Crypto Asset. The Court also made various orders against Ms Ho for the payment of money being the value of the Crypto Asset, for a an account to be given by Ms Ho, and for ByBit to trace and recover the Crypto Asset or the proceeds thereof.

Analysis & Significance

The cases of Quoine v B2C2, CLM v CLN, and Janesh v Unknown Person have pointed in favour of recognition of crypto assets as a form of property, though not definitively for the reasons stated above. That trend culminated in the judgment in ByBit Fintech v Ho Kai Xin, which is revolutionary because it is the first judgment in Singapore to have conclusively recognised that cryptocurrencies are a form of property. As recognised by the judgment, the courts in Singapore and elsewhere have in granting interlocutory injunctions recognised that there is at least a serious question to be tried or a good arguable case that crypto assets are property capable of being held on trust. In so doing, it has not been necessary in those cases to determine whether such crypto assets are choses in action or are instead a novel type of intangible property. To grant judgment and finally declare a trust, the Court had to go further and decide that the crypto assets in question (ie, USDT) were indeed property capable of being held on trust and, if so, what type of property they are. To that end, the Court held that USDT was property capable of being held on trust, and was a chose in action.

The significance of recognizing cryptocurrencies as a form of property is that the Court

could grant final proprietary remedies in respect of cryptocurrencies after considering the substantive merits of the case (in contradistinction to interlocutory orders pending final determination of the merits of the case). Hence, in respect of cryptocurrencies which have been stolen, the Court could impose a trust over those stolen assets such that the thief is holding those assets on trust for the claimant, and the claimant can trace

the proceeds of those stolen assets. Wider than that, there is theoretically nothing to stop the Court from declaring a constructive trust over cryptocurrencies and crypto assets over a range of situations established in law in relation to more established forms of property, including the following:

(a) Breach of trust

(b) Transfer of property subject to a condition

(c) An acquisition of property due to the fraudulent or unconscionable conduct of the defendant

(d) Breach of fiduciary duty

Such a proprietary remedy (such as imposing a constructive trust over the cryptocurrencies held by the defendant) is generally superior over an order for monetary compensation. This is because:

(a) It gives the claimant priority over the general body of the defendant’s creditors in the event of the defendant’s insolvency. Hence, if the thief becomes insolvent, the claimant can simply point to the stolen cryptocurrencies and claim for the return of those, without having to share those with the other creditors of the thief.

(b) Moreover, should the cryptocurrency (or its traceable proceeds) have risen in value from the time of theft to the time of recovery, the claimant’s entitlement is not restricted to the value of the cryptocurrency at the time of theft, but includes the rise in value of the crypto currency, or any “profits” made by the traceable proceeds. Hence, where the Crypto Asset was sold by Ms Ho and the proceeds were used by Ms Ho to pay for the penthouse, the Claimant would be entitled to the rise in the value of the penthouse from the time the penthouse was purchased.

This judgment may be regarded as being progressive in recognising cryptocurrencies as a form of property – something which the commercial world has long assumed to be so. Holders of crypto assets now have greater certainty as to their ownership rights over those assets. This decision is demonstrative of the flexibility of the common law to

extend existing principles to assimilate cryptocurrencies (a new asset class) into the general concepts of property. Indeed, this decision is not an aberration, but follows a firm foundation laid down by a series of three other Singapore judgments stated above which have leaned towards finding that crypto assets are a form of property. While this issue of whether cryptocurrencies are a form a property has not been definitively determined by the apex court in Singapore (ie, the Singapore Court of Appeal), this case adds to the chorus of cases which paved the way for a more definitive decision by the Court of Appeal at a later time.